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Abstract
We present an extension of Logic Programming (under stable models semantics) that, not only allows con-
cluding whether a true atom is a cause of another atom, but also deriving new conclusions from these
causal-effect relations. This is expressive enough to capture informal rules like “if some agent’s actions A
have been necessary to cause an event E then conclude atom caused(A, E),” something that, to the best
of our knowledge, had not been formalised in the literature. To this aim, we start from a first attempt that
proposed extending the syntax of logic programs with so-called causal literals. These causal literals are
expressions that can be used in rule bodies and allow inspecting the derivation of some atom A in the pro-
gram with respect to some query function ψ. Depending on how these query functions are defined, we can
model different types of causal relations such as sufficient, necessary or contributory causes, for instance.
The initial approach was specifically focused on monotonic query functions. This was enough to cover suf-
ficient cause-effect relations but, unfortunately, necessary and contributory are essentially non-monotonic.
In this work, we define a semantics for non-monotonic causal literals showing that, not only extends the
stable model semantics for normal logic programs, but also preserves many of its usual desirable proper-
ties for the extended syntax. Using this new semantics, we provide precise definitions of necessary and
contributory causal relations and briefly explain their behaviour on a pair of typical examples from the
Knowledge Representation literature. (Under consideration for publication in Theory and Practice of Logic
Programming)
1 Introduction
An important difference between classical models and most Logic Programming (LP) seman-
tics is that, in the latter, true atoms must be founded or justified by a given derivation. Con-
sequently, falsity is understood as absence of proof: for instance, a common informal way of
reading for default literal notA is “there is no way to derive A.” Although this idea seems quite
intuitive and, in fact, several approaches have studied how to syntactically build these derivations
or justifications (Specht 1993; Pemmasani et al. 2004; Pontelli et al. 2009; Denecker et al. 2015;
Schulz and Toni 2016), it actually resorts to a concept, the ways to derive A, outside the scope
of the standard LP semantics.
Such information on justifications for atoms can be of great interest for Knowledge Repre-
sentation (KR), and especially, for dealing with problems related to causality. For instance, in
the area of legal reasoning where determining a legal responsibility usually involves finding out
which agent or agents have eventually caused a given result, regardless the chain of effects in-
volved in the process. In this sense, an important challenge in causal reasoning is the capability
of not only deriving facts of the form “A has caused B,” but also being able to represent and
reason about them. As an example, take the assertion:
“If somebody causes an accident, (s)he would receive a fine” (1)
This law does not specify the possible ways in which a person may cause an accident. Depending
on a representation of the domain, the chain of events from the agent’s action(s) to the final effect
may be simple (a direct effect) or involve a complex set of indirect effects and defaults like inertia.
Focussing on representing (1) in an elaboration tolerant manner (McCarthy 1998), we should be
able to write a single rule whose body only refers to the agent involved and the accident. For
instance, consider the following program
accident ← oil (2)
oil ← suzy (3)
suzy (4)
representing that accident is an indirect effect of Suzy’s actions. We may then represent (1) by
the following rule
fine(suzy) ← suzy necessary for accident (5)
that states that Suzy would receive a fine whenever the fact suzy was necessary to cause the
atom accident.
With this long term goal in mind, (Cabalar et al. 2014a) proposed a multi-valued semantics for
LP that extends the stable model semantics (Gelfond and Lifschitz 1988) and where justifications
are treated as algebraic constructions. In this semantics, causal stable models assign, to each
atom, one of these algebraic expressions that captures the set of all non-redundant logical proofs
for that atom. Recently, this semantics was used in (Fandinno 2015b) to extend the syntax of
logic programs with a new kind of literal, called causal literal, that allow representing rules like
fine(suzy) ← suzy sufficient for accident (6)
and derive, from a programP1 containing rules (2-4,6), that fine(suzy) holds. However, the ma-
jor limitation of this semantics is that causal literals must be monotonic and, therefore, rule (5)
cannot be represented. It is easy to see that rule (5) is non-monotonic: in a program P2 contain-
ing rules (2-5), the fact suzy is necessary for accident is satisfied and, thus, fine(suzy) must
hold, but in a program P3 obtained by adding a fact oil to this last program, suzy is not longer
necessary and, thus, fine(suzy) should not be a conclusion.
In this paper, we present a semantics for logic programs with causal literals defined in terms of
non-monotonic query functions. More specifically, we summarise our contributions as follows. In
Section 2, we define the syntax of causal literals and a multi-valued semantics for logic programs
whose causal values rely on a completely distributive lattice based on causal graphs. Section 3
shows that positive monotonic program has a least model that can be computed by an extension
of the direct consequences operator (van Emden and Kowalski 1976). In Section 4, we define
semantics for programs with negation and non-monotonic causal literals and show that it is a
conservative extension of the standard stable model semantics. Besides, with a running example,
we show how causal literals can be used to derive new conclusion from necessary causal relations
and, in Section 5, briefly relate this notion with the actual cause literature. In this section, we also
formalise the weaker notion of contributory cause, also related to the actual cause literature, and
show how causal literals may be used to derive new conclusion from them. In Section 6, we
show that our semantics satisfy the usual properties of the stable modles semantics for the new
syntax. Finally, Section 7 concluded the paper. The online appendices include the definition of
our semantics with nested expression in the body, the formal relation with (Fandinno 2015b), the
proof of formal results from the paper and the formalisation of a Splitting Theorem for causal
programs analgous to (Lifschitz and Turner 1994).
2 Causal Programs
We start by reviewing some definitions from (Cabalar et al. 2014a).
Definition 1 (Term). Given a set of labels Lb, a term t is recursively defined as one of the
following expressions
t ::= l
∣∣∣ ∏S ∣∣∣ ∑S ∣∣∣ t1 · t2
where l ∈ Lb is a label, t1, t2 are in their turn terms and S is a (possibly empty and possible
infinite) set of terms.
When S = {t1, . . . , tn} is a finite set, we will write t1 ∗ . . . ∗ tn and t1 + . . . + tn instead
of
∏
S and
∑
S, respectively. When S = ∅, we denote
∏
S and
∑
S by 1 and 0, respectively.
We assume that application ‘·’ has higher priority than product ‘∗’ and, in its turn, product ‘∗’
has higher priority than addition ‘+’. Application ‘·’ represents application of a rule label to a
previous justifications. For instance, the justification in program P1 for atom suzy is the fact
suzy itself. If rules (2-3) in program P1 are labelled in the following way
r1 : accident ← oil (7)
r2 : oil ← suzy (8)
we may represent the justification of oil as suzy·r2, in other words, oil is true because of the the
application of rule r2 to the fact suzy. Similarly, we may represent the justification of accident
as suzy·r2·r1. Addition ‘+’ is used to capture alternative independent causes: each addend is
one of those independent causes. For instance, the justification of oil, in program P3, may be
represented as suzy·r2 + oil and the justification of accident as (suzy·r2 + oil) · r1. As we
will see below application distributes over addition, so that, the justification of accident can
also be written as suzy·r2·r1 + oil·r1, which better illustrates the existence of two alternatives.
Product ‘∗’ represents conjunction or joint causation. For instance, in a program P4 obtained by
adding the fact billy to P3 and replacing rule (8) by
r2 : oil ← suzy, billy (9)
the justifications of oil will be (suzy ∗ billy)·r2 + oil. Similarly, the justification of accident
will be (suzy ∗ billy)·r2·r1 + oil·r1. Intuitively, terms without addition ‘+’ represent individ-
ual causes while terms with addition ‘+’ represent sets of causes. It is worth to mention that
these algebraic expressions are in a one-to-one correspondence with non-redundant proofs of an
atom (Cabalar et al. 2014a) and that they may also be understood as a formalisation of Lewis’
concept of causal chain (Lewis 1973) (see Fandinno 2015b).
Definition 2 (Value). (Causal) values are the equivalence classes of terms under axioms for a
completely distributive (complete) lattice with meet ‘∗’ and join ‘+’ plus the axioms of Figure 1.
The set of values is denoted by VLb. Furthermore, by CLb we denote the subset of causal values
with some representative term without sums ‘+’.
Associativity
t · (u·w) = (t·u) · w
Absorption
t = t + u · t · w
u · t · w = t ∗ u · t · w
Identity
t = 1 · t
t = t · 1
Annihilator
0 = t · 0
0 = 0 · t
Indempotence
l · l = l
Addition distributivity
t · (u+w) = (t·u) + (t·w)
(t + u) · w = (t·w) + (u·w)
Product distributivity
c · d · e = (c · d) ∗ (d · e) with d 6= 1
c · (d ∗ e) = (c · d) ∗ (c · e)
(c ∗ d) · e = (c · e) ∗ (d · e)
Fig. 1. Properties of the ‘·’operators: t, u, w are terms, l is a label and c, d, e are terms with-
out ‘+’. Addition and product distributivity are also satisfied over infinite sums and products.
All three operations, ‘∗’, ‘+’ and ‘·’ are associative. Product ‘∗’ and addition ‘+’ are also
commutative, and they satisfy the usual absorption and distributive laws with respect to infinite
sums and products of a completely distributive lattice. The lattice order relation is defined as:
t ≤ u iff t ∗ u = t iff t+ u = u
An immediately consequence of this definition is that product, addition, 1 and 0 respectively
are the greatest lower bound, the least upper bound and the top and the bottom element of the
≤-relation. Term 1 represents a value which holds by default, without an explicit cause, and will
be assigned to the empty body. Term 0 represents the absence of cause or the empty set of causes,
and will be assigned to false. Furthermore, applying distributivity (and absorption) of product and
application over addition, every term can be represented in (minimal) disjunctive normal form in
which addition is not in the scope of any other operation and every pair of addends are pairwise
≤-incomparable. In the following, we will assume that every term is in disjunctive normal form.
This semantics was used in (Fandinno 2015b), to define the concept of causal query, here
m-query: a monotonic function φ : CLb −→ {0, 1}. Unfortunately, m-queries are not expressive
enough to capture necessary causation for two reasons: (i) they are monotonic and (ii) they
cannot capture relations between sets of causes. We introduced here the following definition
which removes these two limitations.
Definition 3 (Causal query). A causal query ψ : CLb×VLb −→ {0, 1} is a function mapping
pairs cause-value into 1 (true) and 0 (false) which is anti-monotonic in the second argument,
that is, ψ(G, t) ≤ ψ(G, u) for every G ∈ CLb and {t, u} ⊆ VLb such that t ≥ u.
Syntax. We define the semantics of logic programs using its grounding. Therefore, for the re-
mainder of this paper, we restrict our attention to ground logic programs. A signature is a triple
〈At, Lb,Ψ〉 where At, Lb and Ψ respectively represent sets of atoms (or propositions), labels
and causal queries. We assume the signature of every program contains a causal query ψ1 ∈ Ψ
s.t. ψ1(G, t) def= 1 for every G ∈ CLb and value t ∈ VLb.
Definition 4 (Causal literal). A (causal) literal is an expression (ψ :: A) where A ∈ At is an
atom and ψ ∈ Ψ is a causal query.
A causal atom (ψ1 :: A) is said to be regular and, by abuse of notation, we will use atom A
as shorthand for regular causal literals of the form (ψ1 :: A). We will see below the justification
for this notation. A literal is either a causal literal (ψ :: A) (positive literal), or a negated causal
literal not(ψ :: A) (negative literal) or a double negated causal literal not not(ψ :: A) (consistent
literal) with A ∈ At an atom and ψ ∈ Ψ a causal query.
Definition 5 (Causal program). A (causal) program P is a set of rules of the form:
ri : A ← B1, . . . , Bm (10)
where 0 ≤ m is a non-negative integer, ri ∈ Lb is a label or ri = 1, A (the head of the rule) is
an atom and each Bi with 1 ≤ i ≤ m (the body of the rule) is a literal or a term.
A rule r is said to be positive iff all literals in its body are positive and it is said to be regular
if all causal literals in its body are regular. When m = 0, we say that the rule is a fact and omit
the body and sometimes the symbol ‘←.’ Furthermore, for clarity sake, we also assume that, for
every atom A ∈ At, there is an homonymous label A ∈ Lb and that the label of an unlabelled
rule is assumed to be its head. In this sense, a fact A in a program actually stands for the labelled
rule (A : A←). A program P is positive or regular when all its rules are positive (i.e. it contains
no default negation) or regular, respectively. A standard program is a regular program in which
the label of every rule is ‘1 :’.
Semantics. A (causal) interpretation is a mapping I : At −→ VLb assigning a value to each
atom. For interpretations I and J , we write I ≤ J when I(A) ≤ J(A) for every atom A ∈ At.
Hence, there is a ≤-bottom interpretation 0 (resp. a ≤-top interpretation 1) that stands for the
interpretation mapping every atom A to 0 (resp. 1). For an interpretation I and atom A ∈ At, by
max I(A) we denote the set
max I(A) def=
{
G ∈ CLb
∣∣ G ≤ I(A) and there is no G′ ∈ CLb s.t. G < G′ ≤ I(A) }
containing the maximal terms without addition (or individual causes) of A w.r.t. I .
Definition 6 (Causal literal valuation). The valuation of a causal literal of the form (ψ :: A) with
respect to an interpretation I , in symbols I(ψ :: A), is given by
I(ψ :: A) def=
∑{
G∈ max I(A)
∣∣ ψ(G, I(A) ) = 1 }
We say that I satisfies a causal literal (ψ :: A), in symbols I |= (ψ :: A), iff I(ψ :: A) 6= 0.
Notice now that I(ψ1 :: A) = I(A) for any atom A and, thus, writing a standard atom A as a
shorthand for causal literal (ψ1 :: A) does not modify its intended meaning. Causal literals can
be used to represent the body of rule (5). For instance, given a set of labels A ⊆ Lb representing
the actions of some agent A, we may define the query function
ψnecA (G, t)
def=
{
1 if t ≤
∑
A
0 otherwise
(11)
and represent the body of rule (5) by a causal literal of the form (ψnecSuzy :: accident) where Suzy
is the set of labels {suzy}. In the sake of clarity, we usually will write (A necessary for A)
in rule bodies instead (ψnecA :: A).
If we consider an interpretation I which assigns to the atom accident its justification in pro-
gram P2, that is, I(accident) = suzy·r2·r1, then any term without addition G ∈ CLb, satisfies
ψnecSuzy(G, I)(accident) = 1 iff suzy·r2·r1 ≤
∑
{suzy}
iff suzy·r2·r1 ≤ suzy
iff suzy·r2·r1 + suzy = suzy
which holds applying application identity, associativity and absorption w.r.t. addition
suzy·r2·r1 + suzy = 1 · suzy · (r2·r1) + suzy = suzy
Similarly, in program P3, ψnecSuzy(G, I ′(accident)) = 1 iff suzy·r2·r1 + oil ≤ suzy which does
not hold. In other words, Suzy’s actions has been necessary in programP2 but not in programP3.
The valuation of a causal term t is the class of equivalence of t. The valuation of non-positive
literals is defined as follows
I(not(ψ :: A)) def=
{
1 iff I(ψ :: A) = 0
0 otherwise
I(not not(ψ :: A)) def=
{
1 iff I(ψ :: A) 6= 0
0 otherwise
Furthermore, for any literal or term L, we write I |= L iff I(L) 6= 0.
Definition 7 (Causal model). Given a rule r of the form (10), we say that an interpretation I
satisfies r, in symbols I |= r, if and only if the following condition holds:(
I(B1) ∗ . . . ∗ I(Bm)
)
· ri ≤ I(A) (12)
An interpretation I is a causal model of P , in symbols I |= P , iff I satisfies all rules in P .
Let P5 be the program containing rules (7) and (8) plus the labelled fact (suzy : suzy ←)
and P6 be the program containing rules (7) and (9) plus the labelled facts (suzy : suzy ←)
and (billy : billy ←). Then, it can be checked that these programs respectively have unique
≤-minimal models I5 and I6 which satisfy
I5(accident) = suzy·r2·r1 I6(accident) = (suzy ∗ billy)·r2·r1 + oil
Let now P7 and P8 be the labelled programs respectively obtained by adding the following rule
r3 : fine(suzy) ← suzy necessary for accident (13)
(resulting of labelling rule (5) with r3) to programs P5 and P6. Then it can be checked that these
programs also have unique ≤-minimal models I7 and I8 which respectively agree with I5 and
I6 in all atoms but in fine(suzy) and, as we have seen above,
I7(ψ
nec
Suzy :: accident) = I7(accident) = suzy·r2·r1 I8(ψ
nec
Suzy :: accident) = 0
Furthermore, by definition, it holds that Ij(fine(suzy)) = Ij(ψnecSuzy :: accident)·r3 for
j ∈ {7, 8} which implies that
I7(fine(suzy))) = suzy·r2·r3
I8(fine(suzy))) = 0·r3 = 0
That is, Suzy would receive a fine for causing the accident, I7 |= fine(suzy), w.r.t P7, but not
w.r.t. program P8 because I8 6|= fine(suzy).
It is worth to note that positive programs may contain non-monotonic causal literals that,
somehow, play the role of negation and, hence, they may have several≤-minimal causal models.
Consider, for instance, the following positive program P9
r1 : p r2 : q ← A1 necessary for p
where A1 def={r1}. Program P9 has two ≤-minimal causal models. The first one which satisfies
I9(p) = r1 and I9(q) = r1·r2; and a second unintended one which satisfies I ′9(p) = r1 + r2
and I ′9(q) = 0. In the following section, we introduce the notion of monotonic programs which
have a least model and a well-behaved direct consequences operator (when they are positive). In
Section 4, we will see that, in fact, only I9 is a causal stable model of program P9.
3 Positive monotonic Programs
A causal query ψ is said to be monotonic iff ψ(G, u) ≤ ψ(G′, w) for any values {G,G′} ⊆ CLb
and {u,w} ⊆ VLb such that G ≤ G′. A causal literal (ψ :: A) is monotonic if ψ is monotonic. A
programP is monotonic iff P all causal literals occurring in P are monotonic. We show next that
every monotonic program can be reduced to the syntax and semantics of (Fandinno 2015b). For
space reasons, we omit here the details of (Fandinno 2015b), which can be found in Appendix C.
Definition 8. Given a query ψ (resp. m-query φ), its corresponding m-query (resp. query) is
given by φψ(G) def= ψ(G, 1) (resp. ψφ(G, t) def= φ(G)). Similarly, for any program P (resp. m-
program Q) its corresponding m-program Q (resp. program P ) is obtained by replacing every
query ψ in P (resp. m-query φ in Q) by its corresponding m-query φψ (resp.query ψφ).
Theorem 1. If P is the corresponding program of some positive m-programQ with the syntax of
Definition 5 or Q is the corresponding m-program of some positive monotonic program P , then
an interpretation I is a model of P iff I is a model of Q.
An immediate consequence of Theorem 1, plus Theorem 3.8 in (Fandinno 2015b), is that pos-
itive monotonic programs have a least model that can be computed by iteration of the following
extension of the direct consequences operator of van Emden and Kowalski (1976).
Definition 9 (Direct consequences). Given a causal program P , the operator of direct conse-
quences is a function TP from interpretations to interpretations such that
TP (I)(A)
def=
∑{ (
I(B1) ∗ . . . ∗ I(Bm)
)
· r1
∣∣ (ri : A ← B1, . . . , Bm) ∈ P }
for any interpretation I and any atom A ∈ At. The iterative procedure is defined as usual
T
↑α
P (0)
def= TP (T
↑α−1
P (0)) if α is a successor ordinal
T
↑α
P (0)
def=
∑
β<α
T
↑β
P (0) if α is a limit ordinal
As usual 0 and ω respectively denote the first limit ordinal and the first limit ordinal that is
greater than all integers. Thus, T↑0P (0) = 0.
Corollary 1. Any (possibly infinite) positive monotonic program P has a least causal model I
which (i) coincides with the least fixpoint lfp(TP ) of the direct consequences operator TP and
(ii) can be iteratively computed from the bottom interpretation I = lfp(TP ) = T↑ωP (0).
Corollary 1 guarantees that the least fixpoint of TP is well-behaved and corresponds to the
least model of the program P . In fact, we can check now that the least model I6 of program P6
satisfies I6(accident) = (suzy ∗ billy)·r2·r1+oil·r1. First note, that program P6 contains facts
suzy, billy and oil whose label is the same as the name atom and, thus, T↑1P6
(0)(A) = A for each
atom A ∈ {suzy, billy, oil}. Then, since T↑1P6
(0)(suzy) = suzy, T↑1P6
(0)(billy) = billy and
rule (8) and fact oil belong to program P6, it follows that T↑2P6(0)(oil) = (suzy∗billy) ·r2+oil.
Similarly, we can check that
T
↑3
P6
(0)(accident) = ( (suzy ∗ billy) · r2 + oil) · r1 = (suzy ∗ billy)·r2·r1 + oil·r1
and, thus, I6 = T
↑3
P6
(0) is the least fixpoint of TP6 . Checking that T
↑3
P5
(0) = I5, that T
↑4
P7
(0) =
I7 and that T
↑4
P8
(0) = I8 are the least fixpoint and the least models respectively of programsP5,P7
and P8 is analogous.
It is easy to see that every true atom, according to the standard least model semantics, has a
non-zero causal value associated in the causal least model of the program, that is, some associated
cause. An interpretation I is two-valued when it maps each atom into the set {0, 1}. By Icl, we
denote the two-valued (or “classic”) interpretation corresponding to some interpretation I s.t.
Icl(A) def=
{
1 iff I(A) > 0
0 iff I(A) = 0
Corollary 2. Let P be a regular, positive monotonic program and Q its standard unlabelled
version obtained by removing all labels from the rules in P . Let I and J be the least models of
P and Q, respectively. Then, Icl = J .
4 Non-monotonic causal queries and negation
We introduce now the semantics for programs with non-monotonic causal queries and negation
by extending the concept of reduct (Gelfond and Lifschitz 1988) to causal queries.
Definition 10 (Reduct). For any term t, by ψt we denote a query such that
ψt(G, u) def=
{
1 iff exists some G′ ≤ G s.t. G′ ∈ max t and ψ(G′, t) = 1
0 otherwise
The reduct of a causal literal (ψ :: A) w.r.t some interpretation I is itself if ψ is monotonic and
(ψI(A) :: A) if ψ is non-monotonic. The reduct of a program P w.r.t. an interpretation I , in
symbols P I , is the result of (i) removing all rules whose body contains a non satisfied negative
or consistent literal, (ii) removing all the negative and consistent literals for the remaining rules
and (iii) replacing the remaining causal literals (ψ :: A) by their reducts (ψ :: A)I .
It is easy to see that the reduct P I of any program P is a positive monotonic program and,
therefore, it has a least causal model.
Definition 11 (Causal stable model). We say that an interpretation I is a causal stable model of
a program P iff I is the least model of the positive program P I .
We can check now that interpretation I9 is, in fact, the unique causal stable model of pro-
gram P9. Let Q = P
I9
9 be the reduct of program P9 w.r.t. I9 consisting in the following rules
r1 : p r2 : q ← (ψ :: p)
where ψ(G, t) = 1 iff there exists some G′ ≤ G s.t. G′ ∈ max I9(p) = r1 and ψnecA1(G
′, I9(p))
iff r1 ≤ G and r1 ≤
∑
A1 = r1 iff r1 ≤ G. First note that T↑αQ (0)(p) = r1 = I9(p) for
any ordinal α ≥ 1 because r1 is the only rule with the atom p in the head. Then, note that
T
↑α
Q (0)(ψ :: p) = T
↑α
Q (0)(p) because r1 ≤ G for every G∈ maxT
↑α
Q (0)(p) = r1 (there is only
one such G = r1) and, thus,
T
↑β
Q (0)(q) = T
↑α
Q (0)(ψ :: p)·r2 = T
↑α
Q (0)(p)·r2 = r1·r2 = I9(q)
for any ordinal β ≥ 2. Hence, I9 is a causal stable model of P9. On the other hand, we can
check that I ′9 is not a causal stable model of P9. Let Q
′ = P
I′9
9 be the reduct of program P9
w.r.t. I ′9 consisting in the same rules than programQ, but replacing ψ by ψ
′ where ψ′(G, t) = 1
iff there exists some G′ ≤ G s.t. G′ ∈ max I ′9(p) = r1 + r2 and ψ
nec
A1
(G′, I ′9(p)). As above,
T
↑α
Q′ (0)(p) = r1 6= I
′
9(p) = r1 + r2 for any ordinal α ≥ 1 and, therefore, I9 is not a causal
stable model of program P9.
It is worth to mention that, as happened with positive programs, we can stablish a correspon-
dence between the causal stable models of regular programs and the standard stable models of
their standard version.
Definition 12 (Two-valued equivalence). Two programs P and Q are said to be two-valued
equivalent iff for every causal stable model I of P there is an unique causal stable model J of Q
such that Icl = Jcl, and vice-versa.
Theorem 2. Let P be a regular program andQ be its corresponding standard program obtained
by removing all labels in P . Then P and Q are two-valued equivalent.
Theorem 2 asserts that, labelling a standard program does not change which atoms are true
or false in its stable models, in other words, the causal stable semantics presented here is a
conservative extension of the standard stable model semantic.
5 Contributory cause and its relation with actual causation
Until now we have considered that an agent is a cause of an event when its actions have been nec-
essary to cause that event. This understanding is similar to the definition of the modified Halpern-
Pearl definition of causality given by Halpern (2015). However, in some scenarios it makes sense
to consider a weaker definition in which those agents whose actions have contributed to that event
are also considered causes, even if their actions have not been necessary (Pearl 2000). Consider,
for instance, the following example from (Hopkins and Pearl 2003).
Example 1. For a firing squad consisting of shooters Billy and Suzy, it is John’s job to load
Suzy’s gun. Billy loads and fires his own gun. On a given day, John loads Suzy’s gun. When the
time comes, Suzy and Billy shoot the prisoner. The agents who caused the prisoner death would
be punished with imprisonment.
In this example, although the actions of any of the agents are not necessary for the prisoner’s
death, commonsense tells that all three should be considered responsible of it. If we represent
Example 1 by the following program P10
r1 : dead ← shoot(suzy), loaded
r2 : dead ← shoot(billy)
r3 : loaded ← load(john)
rA : long prison(A) ← A necessary for dead
shoot(suzy)
shoot(billy)
load(john)
for A ∈ {suzy, billy, john}, it can be shown that its unique causal stable model I10 satisfies
I10(dead) =
(
load(john)·r3 ∗ shoot(suzy)
)
· r1 + shoot(billy)·r2
Recall that, we assume that every fact has a label with the same name. According to I10, the
actions of the three agents appear in the causes of the atom dead, but there is no agent whose
actions occur in all causes. Then, the causal literal (A necessary for dead) is not satisfied
for any agent A and, therefore, it holds that I10(long prison(A)) = 0 for every agent A ∈
{suzy, billy, john}. That is, no agent is punished with imprisonment for the prisoner’s death.
On the other hand, if P11 is a program obtained by replacing rules rA by rules
cA : short prison(A, dead) ← A contributed to dead
in programP10, we may expect that short prison(A) holds, in its unique causal stable model I11,
for any A ∈ {suzy, billy, john}. We formalise this by defining the following query
ψcontA (G, t)
def=
{
1 if G ≤
∑
A
0 otherwise
(14)
In the sake of clarity, we will write (A contributed to dead) instead of (ψcontA :: dead). It
can be checked that
(
load(john)·r3 ∗ shoot(suzy)
)
· r1 ≤ load(john) and, therefore,
I11(john contributed to dead) =
(
load(john)·r3 ∗ shoot(suzy)
)
· r1
Consequently, I11(short prison(john)) =
(
load(john)·r3 ∗ shoot(suzy)
)
· r1 · cjohn. Sim-
ilarly, it can be shown that
I11(short prison(suzy)) =
(
load(john)·r3 ∗ shoot(suzy)
)
· r1·csuzy
I11(short prison(billy)) = shoot(billy)·r2 · cbilly
It is worth to note that contributory causes are non-monotonic when defaults are taken into
account. Consider now the following variation of Example 1.
Example 2. Now Suzy also loads her gun as Billy does. However, Suzy’s gun was broken and
John repaired it.
As in Example 1, John’s repairing action is necessary in order for Suzy to be able to fire
her gun. However, in this case, it seems too severe to consider that John has contributed to
the prisoner’s death. This consideration has been widely attributed to the fact that we con-
sider that, by default, things are not broken and that causes must be events that deviate from
the norm (Maudlin 2004; Hall 2007; Halpern 2008; Hitchcock and Knobe 2009). If we represent
this variation by a program P12 containing the following rules1
r1 : dead ← shoot(suzy), un broken
r2 : dead ← shoot(billy)
r3 : un broken ← repair(john)
cA : short prison(A) ← A contributed to dead
shoot(suzy)
shoot(billy)
repair(john)
1 We have chosen this representation in order to illustrate the non-monotonicity of contributory cause. However, solving
the Frame and Qualification Problems (McCarthy and Hayes 1969; McCarthy 1987) would require the introduction of
time and the inertia laws, plus the replacement of rule r1 by the pair of rules (r1 : dead ← shoot(suzy), not ab)
and (ab ← broken). For a detailed discussion of how causality and the inertia laws can combined we refer
to (Fandinno 2015a).
for A ∈ {suzy, billy, john}, then it is easy to see that
I12(dead) =
(
repair(john)·r3 ∗ shoot(suzy)
)
· r1 + shoot(billy)·r2
where I12 is the least model of program P12 and, thus, responsible(john, dead) will be a con-
clusion of it. Just note that program P12 is the result of replacing atoms loaded and load(john)
in program P11 by un broken and repair(john), respectively. Note also that nothing in pro-
gram P12 reflects the fact that by default guns are un broken. We state that guns are un broken
by default adding the following rule
1 : un broken ← not broken (15)
If P13 is the result of adding rule (15) to program P12 and I13 is the least model of P13, then
I13(un broken) = I12(un broken) + 1 = 1
and, consequently,
I12(dead) =
(
1·r3 ∗ shoot(suzy)
)
· r1 + shoot(billy)·r2
=
(
r3 ∗ shoot(suzy)
)
· r1 + shoot(billy)·r2
which shows that John is not considered to have contributed to the prisoner’s death. Hence,
short prison(john) is not a conclusion of program P13. It is worth to mention that besides the
two syntactic differences between causal queries and m-queries already mentioned, there is a,
perhaps, less noticeable difference in the evaluation of causal literals. Note that,(
repair(john)·r3 ∗ shoot(suzy)
)
· r1 ≤
(
r3 ∗ shoot(suzy)
)
· r1
and, thus, if we replacedG∈ max I(A) byG ≤ I(A) in Definition 6 (as done in Fandinno 2015b),
it would follows that atom short prison(john) would be an unintended conclusion of pro-
gram P13. It is also worth to mention that, besides (Pearl 2000) approach, the notion of con-
tributory cause is also behind the definitions of actual cause given in (Halpern and Pearl 2005;
Hall 2007).
6 Properties of causal logic programs
Theorem 2 established a correspondence for regular programs, but they say nothing about pro-
grams with causal queries. For instance, positive program with non-monotonic causal literals
may have more than one causal stable model. Consider the following positive program P14
r1 : p
r3 : q
r2 : q ← A1 necessary for p
r4 : p ← A2 necessary for q
obtained by adding rules r3 and r4 to program P9 and where A2
def={r3}. Program P14 has two
causal stable causal models. The first that satisfies I14(p) = r1 + r3·r4 and I14(q) = r3. The
second I ′14(p) = r1 and I
′
14(q) = r3+ r1·r2. Let nowQ = P
I14
14 be the reduct of program P14
w.r.t. I14, which consists in the following rules
r1 : p
r3 : q
r2 : q ← (ψ1 :: p)
r4 : p ← (ψ2 :: q)
where ψ1(G, t) = 1 iff there exists some G′ ≤ G such that G′ ∈ max I14(p) = r1 + r3·r4 and
ψnecA1(G
′, I14(p)) and ψ2(G, t) = 1 iff there exists G′ ≤ G such that G′ ∈ max I14(q) = r3
and ψnecA2(G
′, I14(p)). First, note that ψnecA1(G
′, I14(p)) iff I14(p) = r1 + r3·r4 ≤
∑
A1 = r1
which does not hold. Thus, ψ1(G, t) = 0 for every G ∈ CLb and t ∈ VLb. Then, it is clear
that the body of rule r2 is never satisfied and, therefore, T↑αQ (0)(q) = r3 for any ordinal α ≥ 1.
It can also be checked that ψ2(r3, T↑αQ (0)(q)) = 1 because there exists G′ = r3 such that
G′ ∈ max I ′14(q) = r3 andψ
nec
A2
(G′, I14(q)) = ψ
nec
A2
(r3, r3) = 1 since r3 ≤
∑
A2 = r3. Hence,
since r3 ∈ maxT↑αQ (0)(q) and ψ2(r3, T
↑α
Q (0)(q)) = 1, it follows that T
↑α
Q (0)(ψ2 :: q) = r3 and
T
↑β
Q (0)(p) = r1 + T
↑α
Q (0)(q)·r4 = r1 + r3·r4 = I9(p) for any ordinal β ≥ 2. Hence, I14 is
the least model of P
I14
14 and a causal stable model of program P14. Showing that I
′
14 is also a
causal stable model of P14 is symmetric.
In the following we revise some desired general properties for a LP semantics. First, causal
stable models should also be supported models. Note that the concept of supported model bellow
is analogous to the usual concept used in standard LP, but it is stronger in the sense that, not only
requires that true atoms are supported, but also all their causes must be supported by a rule and a
cause of its body.
Definition 13. A interpretation I is a (causally) supported model of a program P iff I is a model
of P and for every true atom A and cause G ∈ CLb such thatG ≤ I(A) there is a rule r in P of
the form of (10) such that G ≤ ( I(B1) ∗ . . . ∗ I(Bm)) · ri.
Proposition 1. Any causal stable model I of a program P is a also supported model of P .
Furthermore, as happen with programs with nested negation under the standard stable models
semantics (where stable models may not be minimal models of the program), causal stable mod-
els may not be minimal models either. In fact, this may happen even when the nested negation is
replaced by a non-monotonic causal literal. Consider, for instance, the following program P15
r1 : p r2 : p ← not (A1 necessary for p)
where A1 def={r1}. Program P15 has two causal models. One which satisfies I15(p) = r1. The
other which satisfies I ′15(p) = r1 + r2. We define now the notion of normal program whose
causal stable models are also ≤-minimal models. A program P is normal iff no body rule in P
contains a consistent literal (double negated literal) nor a negated non-monotonic causal literal.
In other words, a program is normal iff it does not contains nested negation nor non-monotonic
causal literals in the scope of negation.
Proposition 2. Any causal stable model I of normal program P is also a≤-minimal model.
Splitting programs. The intuitive meaning of the causal rule (13) in programs P7 and P8 is
to cause the atom fine(suzy) whenever the causal query expressed by its body is true with
respect to a programs P5 and P6, respectively. This intuitive understanding can be formalised as
a splitting theorem in (Lifschitz and Turner 1994).
Theorem 3 (Splitting). Let 〈Pb, Pt〉 a partition of a program P such that no atom occurring in
the head of a rule in Pt occurs in Pb. An interpretation I is a causal stable model of P iff there
is some causal stable model J of Pb such that I is a causal stable model of (J ∪ Pt).
In our running example, the bottom part are P7,b = P5 and P8,b = P6 while their top part
P7,t = P8,t is the program containing the rule (13). This result can be generalised to infinite
splitting sequences as follows.
Definition 14. A splitting sequence of a program P is a family (Pα)α<µ of pairwise disjoint
sets such that P =
⋃
α<µ Pα and no atom occurring in the head of a rule in some Pα occurs in
the body of a rule in ⋃β<α Pβ . A solution of a splitting (Pα)α<µ is a family (Iα)α<µ such that
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1. I0 is a stable model of P0,
2. Iα is a stable model of (Jα ∪ Pα) for any ordinal 0 < α < µ where Jα =
∑
β<α Iβ .
A splitting sequence is said to be strict in α if, in addition, no atom occurring in the head of a
rule in Pα occurs (in the head of a rule) in
⋃
β<α Pβ and it is said to be strict if it is strict in α
for every α < µ.
Theorem 4 (Splitting sequences). Let (Pα)α<µ a splitting sequence of some program P . An
interpretation I is a causal stable model of P iff there is some solution (Iα)α<µ of (Pα)α<µ
such that I =
∑
α<µ Iα. Furthermore, if such solution is strict in α, then Iα = I|Sα where Sα
is the set of all atoms not occurring in the head of any rule in ⋃α<β<µ Pβ and I|Sα denotes the
restriction if I to Sα.
A program P is said to be stratified if there is a some ordinal µ and mapping λ from the set of
atoms At into the set of ordinals {α < µ} such that, for every rule of the form (10) and atom B
occurring in its body, it satisfies λ(A) ≥ λ(B) if B does not occur in the scope of negation nor
in a non-monotonic causal literal, and λ(A) > λ(B) ifB does occur under the scope of negation
or in a non-monotonic causal literal.
Proposition 3. Every stratified causal program P has a unique causal stable model.
7 Conclusions, related work and open issues
The main contribution of this work is the introduction of a semantics for non-monotonic causal
literals that allow deriving new conclusions by inspecting the causal justifications of atoms in
an elaboration tolerant manner. In particular, we have used causal literals to define necessary
and contributory causal relations which are intuitively related to some of the most established
definitions of actual causation in the literature (Pearl 2000; Halpern and Pearl 2005; Hall 2007;
Halpern 2015). Besides, by some running examples we have shown that causal literals allow,
not only to derive whether some event is the cause or not of another event, but also to derive
new conclusions from this fact. From a technical point of view, we have shown that our seman-
tics is a conservative extension of the stable model semantics and that satisfy the usual desired
properties for an LP semantics (casual stable models are supported models, minimal models
in case of normal programs and can be iteratively computed by split table programs). It worth
to mention that, besides the syntactic approaches to justifications in LP, the more related ap-
proach to our semantics is (Dama´sio et al. 2013), for which a formal comparative can be found
in (Cabalar and Fandinno 2016a) and that (Pontelli et al. 2009) allows a Prolog system to reason
about justifications of an ASP program, but justifications cannot be inspected inside the ASP
program.
Regarding complexity, it has been shown in (Cabalar et al. 2014b) that there may be an ex-
ponential number of causes for a given atom w.r.t. each causal stable model. Despite that, the
existence of stable model for programs containing only monotonic queries evaluable in polyno-
mial time is NP-complete (Fandinno 2015b). For programs containing only necessary causal lit-
erals we can prove NP-complete (NP-hard holds even for programs containing a single negated
regular literal or positive programs containing a single constraint, see Proposition 35 in the Ap-
pendix). The complexity for programs including other non-monotonic causal literals (like con-
tributory) is still an open question. A preliminary prototype extending the syntax of logic pro-
grams with causal literals capturing sufficient, necessary and contributory causal relation can be
tested on-line at http://kr.irlab.org/cgraphs-solver/nmsolver.
In a companion paper (Cabalar and Fandinno 2016b), the causal semantics used here has been
extended to disjunctive logic programs, which will be useful for representing non-deterministic
causal laws. Interesting topics include a complexity assessment or studying an extension to arbi-
trary theories as with Equilibrium Logic (Pearce 2006) for the non-causal case; and formalise the
relation between our notions of necessary and contributory cause with the above definitions of
the actual causation and, in particular, with (Vennekens 2011) who has studied it in the context of
CP-logic. A promising approach seems to translate structural equations into logic programs in a
similar way as it has been done to translate them into the causal theories (Giunchiglia et al. 2004;
Bochman and Lifschitz 2015).
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Appendix A. Nested expressions in rule bodies
In this section we extend the syntax presented in Section 2 in order to allow nested expressions
in rule bodies (Lifschitz et al. 1999).
Definition 15. A formula F is recursively defined as one of the following expressions
F ::= t | C | E,H | E;H | notE
where t is a term, C is a causal literal (Definition 4) and both, E and H are formulas in their
turn.
A formulaF is said to be elementary iff it is a term t or a causal literalC. It is said to be regular
iff every causal literal occurring in it is regular and is said to be positive iff the operator not does
not occur in it. F is said to monotonic iff every causal literal occurring in F is monotonic. In
formulas, we will write ⊤ and ⊥ instead of 1 and 0, respectively.
Definition 16 (Causal logic program). Given a signature 〈At, Lb,Ψ〉, a (causal logic) program
P is a set of rules of the form:
ri : A ← F (A1)
where ri ∈ Lb is a label or ri = 1, A ∈ At (the head of the rule) is an atom or A = ⊥ and F
(the body of the rule) is a formula.
A rule r is said to be regular iff its body is regular and its said to be positive iff its body is
positive and A 6= ⊥. It is said to be monotonic iff F is monotonic. If F = ⊤, we say the rule is
a fact and omit the body and sometimes the symbol ‘←.’ A program P is regular, positive or
monotonic when all its rules are regular, positive or monotonic, respectively. A standard program
is a regular in which the label of every rule is ‘1 :’. Definition 16 extends Definition 5 by allowing
nested expressions in the rule bodies. A causal program in the sense of Definition 5 is a program
in which the body F of all rules are conjunctions of regular causal literals or their negation. Note
that every rule of the form of (10) withm = 0 corresponds to a rule of the form of (ri : A ← ⊤).
Semantics. The semantics of causal logic programs with nested expressions is given as follows.
Definition 17 (Valuation). The valuation of causal literals and causal terms is as given by Defi-
nition 6. Otherwise, the valuation of a formula F is recursively defined as follows
I(E,H) = I(E) ∗ I(H)
I(E;H) = I(E) + I(H)
I(notE) =
{
1 iff I(E) = 0
0 otherwise
We say that I satisfies a formula F , in symbols I |= F , iff I(F ) 6= 0.
Definition 18 (Causal model). Given a rule r of the form (A1), we say that an interpretation I
satisfies r, in symbols I |= r, if and only if the following condition holds:
I(F ) · ri ≤ I(A) (A2)
An interpretation I is a causal model of P , in symbols I |= P iff I satisfies all rules in P .
The following result shows that Definition 18 agrees with Definition 7 for programs within the
syntax of Definition 5 and, thus, the former is a conservative extension of the last to programs
with nested expressions in the body.
Proposition 4. For any program P with the syntax of Definition 5, an interpretation I is a model
of P w.r.t. Definition 7 iff I is a model of P w.r.t. Definition 18.
We also can extend the definition of the direct consequences operator to programs with nested
expressions as follows.
Definition 19 (Direct consequences). Given a causal program with nested expressions P , the
operator of direct consequences is a function TP from interpretations to interpretations such
that
TP (I)(A)
def=
∑{
I(F ) · r1
∣∣ (ri : A ← F ) ∈ P }
for any interpretation I and any atom A ∈ At. The iterative procedure is defined as usual
T
↑α
P (0)
def= TP (T
↑α−1
P (0)) if α is a successor ordinal
T
↑α
P (0)
def=
∑
β<α
T
↑β
P (0) if α is a limit ordinal
As usual 0 and ω respectively denote the first limit ordinal and the first limit ordinal that is
greater than all integers. Thus, T↑0P (0) = 0.
We will show in the Appendix C that, if P is monotonic and positive, then the TP operator has
a least fixpoint that can be computed by iteration from the bottom interpretation 0.
Causal stable models of programs with nested expressions.
Definition 20 (Reduct). The reduct of a causal literal and terms is as in Definition 10. The reduct
of formulas is inductively defined as follows
(E,H)I = (EI , HI)
(E;H)I = (EI ;HI)
(notE)I =
{
⊥ if I |= EI
⊤ otherwise
The reduct of program P is the program
P I def= { rI
∣∣ r ∈ P }
where the reduct rI of a rule r like (10) is given by (ri : H ← F I).
Definition 21 (Formula equivalence). A formula F is said to be equivalent to a formula E, in
symbols F ⇔ E, iff any pair of causal interpretations I and J satisfy that I(F J) = I(EJ ).
Proposition 5. For any formula F , the following simplifications are valid align=Center, left-
margin=10pt, itemindent=0.5pt
1. (F,⊤)⇔ F and (⊤, F )⇔ F .
2. (F ;⊤)⇔ ⊤ and (⊤;F )⇔ ⊤.
3. (F,⊥)⇔ ⊥ and (⊥, F )⇔ F
4. (F ;⊥)⇔ F and (⊥;F )⇔ F .
Definition 22 (Causal stable model). We say that an interpretation I is a causal stable model of a
program with nested expressions P iff I is the least model of the positive monotonic program P I
(Definition 20).
Proposition 6. For any program P with the syntax of Definition 5, the reduct of P w.r.t. to
an interpretation I and Definition 10 is the same as the reduct of P w.r.t. I and Definition 20
after applying the simplifications from Proposition 5 and removing all rules whose body is ⊥.
Consequently, the causal stable models of P w.r.t. Definitions 11 and 22 are the same.
Proposition 7. Let P be a causal program with nested expressions. Any causal stable model I
of P is a model of P .
Proposition 8. Let P be a causal program with nested expressions. Any causal stable model I
of a P is a also supported model of P .
Proposition 9. Let P be a causal program with nested expressions. Then, any causal stable
model I of P is also a ≤-minimal model of P .
Note that Propositions 1 and 2 in the main part of the paper, are direct consequences of Propo-
sition 6 together with Propositions 8 and 9, respectively.
Splitting programs. The intuitive meaning of the causal rule (13) in programs P7 and P8 is to
cause the atom responsible(suzy, accident) whenever the causal query expressed by its body
is true with respect to a programs P5 and P6, respectively. This intuitive understanding can be
formalised as a splitting theorem in (Lifschitz and Turner 1994).
Theorem 5 (Splitting). Let 〈Pb, Pt〉 a splitting of some program with nested expressions P . An
interpretation I is a causal stable model of P iff there is some causal stable model J of Pb such
that I is a causal stable model of (J ∪ Pt). Furthermore, if 〈Pb, Pt〉 is a strict splitting, then
J = I|S where S is the set of atoms of all atoms not occurring in the head of any rule in Pt.
In our running example, the bottom part are P7,b = P5 and P8,b = P6 while their top part
P7,t = P8,t is the program containing the rule (13). We also can generalise this to infinite
splitting sequences.
Definition 23. A splitting sequence of a program P is a family (Pα)α<µ of pairwise disjoint
sets such that P =
⋃
α<µ Pα and no atom occurring in the head of a rule in some Pα occurs in
the body of a rule in ⋃β<α Pβ . A solution of a splitting (Pα)α<µ is a family (Iα)α<µ such that
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1. I0 is a stable model of P0,
2. Iα is a stable model of (Jα ∪ Pα) for any ordinal 0 < α < µ where Jα =
∑
β<α Iβ .
A splitting sequence is said to be strict in α if, in addition, no atom occurring in the head of a
rule in Pα occurs (the head of a rule) in
⋃
β<α Pβ and it is said to be strict if it is strict in α for
every α < µ.
Theorem 6 (Splitting sequences). Let (Pα)α<µ a splitting sequence of some program with
nested expressions P . An interpretation I is a causal stable model of P iff there is some so-
lution (Iα)α<µ of (Pα)α<µ such that I =
∑
α<µ Iα. Furthermore, if such solution is strict
in α, then Iα = I|Sα where Sα is the set of all atoms not occurring in the head of any rule
in
⋃
α<β<µ Pβ .
A program P is said to be stratified iff there is a some ordinal µ and mapping mapping λ from
the set of atoms At into the set of ordinals {α < µ} such that, for every rule of the form (A1)
and atom B occurring in the body F , it satisfies λ(A) ≥ λ(B) if B does not occur in the scope
of negation or a non-monotonic causal literal, and λ(A) > λ(B) ifB does occur under the scope
of negation or a non-monotonic causal literal.
Proposition 10. Every stratified causal program with nested expressions P has a unique causal
stable model if it does not contain any rule whose head is ⊥.
Propositions 3, in the main part of the paper, is a direct consequence of Propositions 6 and 10.
Normal form. Proposition 6 show that Definition 22 is a conservative extension of Defini-
tions 11. In the following we show that, in fact, the syntax of Definition 5 is a normal form,
that is, for every program P in the syntax of Definition 16, there is some program Q with the
syntax of Definition 5 which has exactly the same causal stable models than P .
Definition 24. For program P and Q we write P ⇔ Q when I satisfies all rules in P J iff I
satisfies all rules in QJ for any pair of causal interpretations I and J .
Definition 25 (Strong equivalence). Two programs P and Q are said to be strongly equivalent
iff for every program P ′, (P ∪ P ′) and (Q ∪ P ′) have the same causal stable models.
Proposition 11. Any two causal programs P and Q s.t. P ⇔ Q are strongly equivalent.
Proposition 12. Let P be a causal program, and let F and E be a pair of equivalent formulas,
that is F ⇔ E. Any program obtained from P by replacing some occurrences of F by E is
strongly equivalent to P .
The following result collects some of equivalence among formulas that correspond to those
in (Lifschitz et al. 1999).
Proposition 13. For any formulasF ,E andH , align=Center, leftmargin=10pt, itemindent=0.5pt
1. F,E ⇔ E,F and F ;G⇔ G;F .
2. F, (E,H)⇔ (F,E), H and F ; (E;H)⇔ (F ;E);H .
3. F, (E;H)⇔ (F,E); (F,H) and F ; (E,H)⇔ (F ;E), (F ;H).
4. not(F,E)⇔ I(notF ; notE) and not(F ;E))⇔ notF, notE.
5. not not notF ⇔ notF .
6. F,⊤ ⇔ F and F ;⊤ ⇔ ⊤.
7. F,⊥ ⇔ ⊥ and F ;⊥ ⇔ F .
8. not⊤ ⇔ ⊥ and not⊥ ⇔ ⊤.
A formula F is said to be a simple conjunction (resp. simple disjunction) iff is a conjunction
(resp. disjunction) of elementary formulas.
Proposition 14. Any formula F is equivalent to a formula of the form align=Center, leftmar-
gin=10pt, itemindent=0.5pt
1. F1; . . . ;Fn where n ≥ 1 and each Fi is a simple conjunction, and
2. F1, . . . , Fn where n ≥ 1 and each Fi is a simple disjunction.
Proposition 15. A causal rule (ri : A← F ;E) is equivalent to
ri : A ← F
ri : A ← E
for any label ri, atom A and formulas F and E.
Proposition 16. Any program is strongly equivalent of a set of rules of the form (10) if ⊥ is
allowed in the head.
Proposition 17. For every program P , there is some program Q with the syntax of Definition 5
which has exactly the same causal stable models than P .
Appendix B. Uniform reduct for monotonic and non-monotonic queries
An issue with Definitions 10 and 20 is that it is necessary to know whether a causal query is
monotonic or not to apply the reduct. This can be provided by the user, but otherwise automat-
ically checked whether a causal query is monotonic or not can be computationally costly. In
the following, we show that, in fact, this distinction is not necessary and that the reduct can be
applied uniformly to monotonic and non-monotonic causal literals.
Definition 26 (Reduct). The reduct of causal queries is defined as in Definition 10. The reduct of
a causal literal is given by (ψI(A) :: A) for any causal literal of the form of (ψ :: A). The reduct
of formulas, rules and programs is then defined as in Definition 20.
Definition 26 applies the reduct uniformly to monotonic and non-monotonic causal literals. A
consequence of this fact is that the reduct of monotonic programs is not itself and, in fact, the
least model of the reduct of a monotonic program P Iw.r.t. an interpretation I can be different
according to Definitions 20 and 26. Despite that, the following result shows that the causal stable
models of a program P are the same in spite of whether Definition 20 or Definition 26 is used.
Proposition 18. Let P be a causal program with nested expressions. An interpretation I is
the least model of P I (according to Definition 20) iff I is the least model of P I (according to
Definition 26).
Appendix C. Comparative with (Fandinno 2015b)
In this section we revise the syntax and semantics of causal programs given in (Fandinno 2015b)
and show how programs in this framework can be translated in ours.
Syntax. A m-query is a monotonic function φ : GLb −→ {0, 1} assigning true or false to every
causal graphs G ∈ CLb. A signature is a triple 〈At, Lb,Φ〉 where At, Lb and Φ respectively
represent sets of atoms (or propositions), labels and query functions.
Definition 27 (m-literal). A m-literal is an expression (φ :: A) where A ∈ At is an atom and
φ ∈ Φ is a m-query.
Formulas, rules and programs are defined as in our framework (Section A), but replacing
causal literals (Definition 4) by m-literals (Definition 27).
Semantics. The semantics of m-programs is as follows.
Definition 28 (Valuation). The valuation of a causal literal of the form (φ :: A) with respect to
an interpretation I is given by
I(φ :: A) def=
∑{
G ∈ GLb
∣∣ G ≤ I(A) and φ(G) = 1 }
The valuation of causal terms and formulas is inductively defined as in Definition 17.
The definition of causal models and the TP operator is as in Definitions 18 and 19, respectively,
but evaluating formulas according to Definition 28 instead of Definition 17.
Theorem 7 (From Fandinno 2015b). Let P be a (possibly infinite) positive logic program (with
nested expressions). Then, (i) lfp(TP ) is the least model of P and (ii) lfp(TP ) = T↑ωP (0).
Theorem 8 (From Fandinno 2015b). Let P be a regular positive program (with nested expres-
sions) and Q its standard unlabelled version. Then, the least model J = Icl of Q is the two-
valued interpretation corresponding to the least model I of P .
The definition of reduct and causal stable models is as Definitions 20 and Definition 22.
Theorem 9 (From Fandinno 2015b). Let P be a regular program (with nested expressions) and
Q be its corresponding standard program obtained by removing all labels in P . Then, P and Q
are two-valued equivalent.
Encoding (Fandinno 2015b) m-programs in our framework. In the following we show that
every program according to (Fandinno 2015b) can be fitted in our framework.
Definition 29. Given a m-program Q, its corresponding program P consists of rule of the form
ri : A ← F
′
for every rule of the form (ri : A ← F ) in Q where F ′ is the result of replacing every m-query
φ by its corresponding query ψ given by ψ(G, t) = φ(G).
Proposition 19. If P is the corresponding program of some positive m-program (with nested
expressions) Q, then an interpretation I is a model of P iff I is a model of Q.
Encoding of monotonic programs into (Fandinno 2015b). It is clear that not every program in
our framework can be fitted into a m-program because the last only allows monotonic queries.
However, if all causal queries in a program are monotonic, then there is an equivalent m-program
given as follows.
Definition 30. Given a program with nested expressions P in which all causal queries are mono-
tonic, its corresponding m-program Q consists of rule of the form
ri : A ← F
′
for every rule of the form (ri : A ← F ) in Q where F ′ is the result of replacing every query
ψ by its corresponding query φ given by φ(G) = ψ(G, 1).
Proposition 20. If Q is the corresponding m-program of some positive monotonic program with
nested expressions P , then an interpretation I is a model of P iff I is a model of Q.
Note that Theorem 1 is a direct consequence of Proposition 4 together with the result of Propo-
sitions 19 and 20. Furthermore, the following Corollaries 3, 4 and 5 are direct consequences of
Proposition 20 together with the results of Theorems 7, 8 and 9, respectively. Corollary 6 is a
direct consequence of Corollary 5.
Corollary 3. Any (possibly infinite) positive monotonic causal program with nested expres-
sions P has a least causal model I which (i) coincides with the least fixpoint lfp(TP ) of the
direct consequences operator TP and (ii) can be iteratively computed from the bottom interpre-
tation I = lfp(TP ) = T↑ωP (0).
Corollary 4. Let P be a regular positive monotonic program with nested expressions and Q its
standard unlabelled version obtained by removing all labels from the rules in P . Let I and J be
the least models of P and Q, respectively. Then, Icl = J .
Corollary 5. Let P be a regular program with nested expressions and Q be its corresponding
standard program obtained by removing all labels in P . Then P and Q are two-valued equiva-
lent.
Corollary 6. Any two regular programs with nested expressions that only differ in their labels
are two-valued equivalent.
Corollaries 1 and 2 and Theorem 2 in the main part of the paper are direct consequences of
Proposition 4 plus Corollaries 3, 4 and 5, respectively.
Appendix D. Proof of Results
Preliminary facts
Proposition 21 (From Cabalar et al. 2014a). Addition, product and application are monotonic
operations, that is, t + u ≤ t′ + u′, t ∗ u ≤ t′ ∗ u′ and t · u ≤ t′ · u′ for any causal values
{t, u, t′, u′} ⊆ VLb such that t ≤ t′ ant u ≤ u′.
Proposition 22 (From Cabalar et al. 2014a). Every causal value G ∈ CLb without addition is
completely addition-prime, that is, G ≤
∑
t∈T t implies that G ≤ t for some t ∈ T where
T ⊆ VLb is a set of causal values.
Properties of the causal queries and causal literals
Proposition 23. The evaluation of a causal literal (ψ :: A) is ≤-monotonic for every monotonic
causal query ψ, that is, J(ψ :: A) ≤ I(ψ :: A) for every pair of interpretations I and J such
that J ≤ I .
Proof. By definition, it follows that
X(ψ :: A) def=
∑{
G ∈ CLb
∣∣ G∈ maxX(A) and ψ(G, X(A) ) = 1 }
with X ∈ {I, J}. For the sake of contradiction, suppose that J(ψ :: A) 6≤ I(ψ :: A). Then,
there is G∈ maxJ(ψ :: A) such that G 6≤ I(ψ :: A). Note that G∈ max J(ψ :: A) implies
G∈ maxJ(A) and, since J ≤ I , this implies that there existsG′ ∈ max I(A) such thatG ≤ G′.
Hence, since J ≤ I and ψ is monotonic, ψ(G, J(A) ) = 1 implies ψ(G′, I(A) ) = 1 and,
therefore,G ≤ G′ ≤ I(ψ :: A) which contradicts the assumption.
Proposition 24. The reduct of a causal query ψ w.r.t. term t, in symbols ψt is monotonic.
Proof. Suppose that ψt is not monotonic. Then there are G,G′′ ∈ CLb and u,w ∈ VLb such
that G ≤ G′′ and ψt(G, u) = 1, but ψt(G′′, w) = 0. By definition,
ψt(G, u) = 1 iff exists some G′ ≤ G s.t. G′ ∈ max t and ψ(G′, t) = 1 (D1)
Similar for G′′ and w. Pick some G satisfying (D1). Since G′ ≤ G and G ≤ G′′, it follows
that G′ ≤ G′′ and, since G′ ≤ G′′ and G′ ∈ max t and ψ(G′, t) = 1, it also follows that
ψt(G′′, w) = ψt(G′′, u) = 1 which is a contradiction with the assumption. Hence, ψt is mono-
tonic.
Proposition 25. Any monotonic causal queryψ satisfies thatψt(G, u) ≤ ψ(G, u) for any causal
values G ∈ CLb and {t, u} ⊆ VLb.
Proof. Suppose that ψt(G, u) 6≤ ψ(G, u). Then, ψt(G, u) = 1 and ψ(G, u) = 0. By definition,
ψt(G, u) def=
{
1 iff exists some G′ ≤ G s.t. G′ ∈ max t and ψ(G′, t) = 1
0 otherwise
and, thus, there exists some G′ ≤ G such that G′ ∈ max t and that ψ(G′, t) = 1. Since ψ is
monotonic, G′ ≤ G and ψ(G′, t) = 1 implies that ψ(G, u) = 1 for any u ∈ VLb which is a
contradiction with the fact that ψ(G, u) = 0.
Proposition 26. Let I and J be two interpretations. Then, J(ψ :: A)I ≤ J(ψ :: A) for any
atom A ∈ At and any a monotonic causal query ψ.
Proof. Pick any G∈ max J(ψ :: A)I . By definition, G∈ maxJ(A) and ψI(A)(G, J(A)) = 1.
Furthermore, from Proposition 25, ψI(A)(G, J(A)) = 1 implies ψ(G, J(A)) = 1 and, thus,
G ≤ J(ψ :: A). Therefore, J(ψ :: A)I ≤ J(ψ :: A).
Note that in general J(ψ :: A)I 6= J(ψ :: A) may hold even if J ≤ I . Consider, for instance,
a pair of interpretation J(A) = a ∗ b and I(A) = a and a monotonic causal query ψ(a ∗ b) =
ψ(a) = 1. Then, J(ψ :: A) = a ∗ b, but J(ψ :: A)I = 0 because a ∗ b 6∈ max I(A).
Properties of formulas
Proposition 27. Any monotonic formula F is≤-monotonic, that is, J(F ) ≤ I(F ) for any causal
interpretations I and J such that J ≤ I .
Proof. In case that F is a causal literal of the form (ψ :: A), from Proposition 23, it follows
that J(ψ :: A) ≤ I(ψ :: A). Otherwise, we proceed by structural induction assuming the lemma
holds for every subformula of F . In case that F = (E,A), by induction hypothesis E and A are
≤-monotonic and, thus, since product is also monotonic, it follows that F is ≤-monotonic. The
case F = (E;A) is analogous. Finally, for the case F = notE, just note that F is not positive
and, thus, F is not monotonic by definition.
Proposition 28. Any causal interpretation I and formula F satisfy I(F I) = I(F ).
Proof. In case that F is a causal literal of the form (ψ :: A), its reduct (ψ :: A)I is (ψI(A) :: A).
Furthermore, by definition,
ψI(A)(G, t) = 1 iff exist G′ ≤ G s.t. G′ ∈ max I(A) and ψ(G′, I(A))
Then, G∈ max I(ψI(A) :: A) implies that G∈ max I(A) and there exists some G′ ≤ G
such that G′ ∈ max I(A) and ψ(G′, I(A)) = 1. Note that, since G′ ≤ G∈ max I(A) and
G′ ∈ max I(A), it follows that G = G′. Then, ψ(G′, I(A)) = 1 implies that ψ(G, I(A)) = 1
and, consequently,G ≤ I(ψ :: A). That is, I(F I) ≤ I(F ). The other way around.G∈ max I(ψ ::
A) implies that G∈ max I(A) and ψ(G, I(A)) = 1 which in turn imply that ψI(A)(G, I(A)) =
1 and G∈ max I(ψI(A) :: A). Consequently, I(ψI(A) :: A) = I(ψ :: A).
In any other case, we proceed by structural induction assuming the lemma holds for every sub-
formula of F . In case that F = (E,H), by definition,
I(F I) = I(E,H)I = I(EI , HI) = I(EI) ∗ I(HI)
Furthermore, by induction hypothesis I(EI) = I(E) and I(HI) = I(H) and, thus,
I(F I) = I(E) ∗ I(H) = I(E,H) = I(F )
The case F = (E;H) is analogous. Finally, for the case H = notE, just note that I(notE)I =
I(⊥) = 0 iff I |= EI iff I |= E iff I(notE) = 0. Otherwise I(notE)I = I(⊤) = 1 and
I(notE) = 1.
Lemma D.1. Let I and J be two interpretations. Then, J(F I) ≤ J(F ′) ≤ J(F ) for any
monotonic formula F and F ′ where F ′ is either F I or the result of replacing in F I some reduced
causal query ψt by its non-reduced form ψ.
Proof. In case that F is a causal literal of the form (ψ′ :: A), from Proposition 26, it follows that
J(F I) = J(ψI(A) :: A) ≤ J(ψ :: A) = J(F ). Furthermore, if in addition ψ′ = ψ, it follows
that F ′ = F and the lemma statement follow from the above inequality. Otherwise F ′ = F I and
the result follow in a similar way.
We proceed by structural induction assuming the statement holds for every subformula of F . In
case that F = (E,H), by definition,
J(F I) = J( (E,H)I ) = J(EI , HI) = J(EI) ∗ J(HI)
J(F ′) = J( (E,H)′ ) = J(E′, H ′) = J(E′) ∗ J(H ′)
Furthermore, by induction hypothesis, J(EI) ≤ J(E′) ≤ J(E) and J(HI) ≤ J(H ′) ≤ J(H)
and, since product ∗ is monotonic, it follows that,
J(F I) = J(EI) ∗ J(HI) ≤ J(E′) ∗ J(H ′) = J(E′, H ′) = J(F ′)
J(F ′) = J(E′) ∗ J(H ′) ≤ J(E) ∗ J(H) = J(E,H) = J(F )
The case F = (E;H) is analogous. Finally, note that F = notE is not a positive formula and,
by definition, it is not a monotonic formula either.
Proposition 29. Let F be a monotonic formula and I be an interpretation. Then, J(F I) ≤ J(F )
for any interpretation J such that J ≤ I .
Proof. It follows directly from Lemma D.1.
Proposition 30. Let F be a normal formula and I be an interpretation. Then, J(F I) ≤ J(F )
for any interpretation J such that J ≤ I .
Proof. In case that F is a causal literal of the form (ψ :: A), its reduct (ψ :: A)I is (ψI(A) :: A).
Note that G∈ maxJ(ψI(A) :: A) implies G∈ maxJ(A) and ψI(A)(G, J(A)) = 1. Further-
more, by definition,
ψI(A)(G, J(A)) = 1 iff exist G′ ≤ G s.t. G′ ∈ max I(A) and ψ(G′, I(A))
Since G′ ≤ G ≤ J(A) ≤ I(A) and G∈ max I(A), it follows that G = G′. Then, since
J ≤ I , queries are anti-monotonic in the second argument and ψ(G, I(A)) = 1, it follows
that ψ(G, J(A)) = 1 and, since G∈ maxJ(A), it also follows that G ≤ J(ψ :: A). That is,
J(F I) ≤ J(F )
Otherwise, we proceed by structural induction assuming the lemma holds for every subformula
of F . In case that F = (E,A), by definition,
J(F I) = J( (E,H)I ) = J(EI , HI) = J(EI) ∗ J(HI)
Furthermore, by induction hypothesis, J(EI) ≤ J(E) and J(HI) ≤ J(H) and, since product ∗
is monotonic, it follows that,
J(F I) = J(EI) ∗ J(HI) ≤ J(E) ∗ J(H) = J(E,H) = J(F )
The case F = (E;H) is analogous. Finally, in case F = notE, since F is a normal formula, E
is positive and every query ψ occurring in E is monotonic. Hence, from the fact J ≤ I and the
fact that monotonic formulas are also ≤-monotonic, it follows J(E) ≤ I(E) (Proposition 27).
Furthermore,
if J( (notE)I ) = 1 then I 6|= EI
then I(EI) = 0
then I(E) = 0 (Proposition 28)
then J(E) = 0
then J(notE) = 1
That is, J( (notE)I ) = 1 implies that J(notE) = 1. Otherwise, J(notE)I = 0 and the term 0
is smaller than any causal value and, thus, J( (notE)I ) ≤ J(notE) holds and, consequently, it
follows that J(F I) ≤ J(F ).
Proof of Proposition 4
Proof of Proposition 4. Assume that I is a model of P w.r.t. Definition 7 and suppose that I is
not a model ofP w.r.t. Definition 18. Then, there is a rule r of the form of (r1 : A ← B1, . . . , Bm)
such that I(B1, . . . , Bm) · ri 6≤ A, but that I(B1) ∗ . . . ∗ I(Bm) · ri ≤ A. If m > 0, then from
Definition 17 it follows that I(B1, . . . , Bm) = I(B1) ∗ . . . ∗ I(Bm) which is a contradiction. If
m = 0, then
∏
∅ = 1 = I(⊤) which is also a contradiction. The other way around is symmetri-
cal.
Proof of Proposition 5
Proof of Proposition 5. For (i), note that ⊤ = 1, then
I((F,⊤)J ) = I(F J ,⊤J)
= I(F J) ∗ I(⊤)
= I(F J) ∗ I(1)
= I(F J) ∗ 1
= I(F J)
The remaining cases are analogous. Just note that ⊥ = 0.
Proof of Proposition 6
Proof of Proposition 6. Let r be a rule of the form of
ri : A ← B1, . . . , Bm, Bm+1, . . . , Bn
where Bj is a positive literal with 1 ≤ j ≤ m and Bj is either a negative or a consistent literal
with m + 1 ≤ j ≤ n. According to Definition 20, if I |= Bj with m + 1 ≤ j ≤ n, then the
reduct of rule r is a rule rI of the form
ri : A ← C1, . . . , Cm,⊤, . . . ,⊤
where Cj is the reduct of causal literal Bj for 1 ≤ j ≤ m. After applying the simplifications in
Proposition 5, it follows that rI becomes
ri : A ← C1, . . . , Cm
which agrees with Definition 10. On the other hand, if I 6|= Bj for some m + 1 ≤ j ≤ n, it
follows that BIJ = ⊥ and, therefore,
(B1, . . . , Bm, Bm+1, . . . , Bj−1, Bj , Bj+1 . . . , Bn)
I = ⊥
Hence, rI is of the from
ri : A ← ⊥
and rI does not belong to P I after removing all rules whose body is ⊥. Therefore, the reduct
according to Definition 20 is the same as the Definition 10 for programs with the syntax of
Definition 5 and the causal stable models w.r.t. Definitions 11 and 22 are the same, too.
Proof of Proposition 19
Lemma D.2. Let F be some m-formula and F ′ be is corresponding formula obtained by replac-
ing every m-query φ by its corresponding query ψ given by ψ(G, t) = φ(G). Then, it holds that
I(F ) = I(F ′) for every interpretation I .
Proof. In case that F = (φ :: A) is a m-literal, by definition
I(φ :: A) =
∑{
G ∈ GLb
∣∣ G ≤ I(A) and φ(G) = 1 }
Furthermore, since φ is monotonic, for every G ≤ I(A) such that φ(G) = 1, there is some G′
such that G ≤ G′ ∈ max I(A) and φ(G) = 1 and, thus,
I(φ :: A) =
∑{
G ∈ GLb
∣∣ G∈ max I(A) and φ(G) = 1 }
Then, since ψ(G, t) = φ(G) for any t ∈ VLb, it is clear that
I(φ :: A) =
∑{
G ∈ GLb
∣∣ G∈ max I(A) and ψ(G, I(A)) = 1 }
= I(ψ :: A)
In case that F is not a m-literal, the proof follows by structural induction assuming as induction
hypothesis that I(E) = I(E′) for every subformulaE of F .
Proof of Proposition 19. Assume that I is a model and Q and suppose that I is not a model
of P . Then, there is some rule r of the form (ri : A ← F ) in P such that I(F ) · r1 6≤ I(A).
However, since r is in P there is a rule r′ of the form (ri : A ← F ) in Q where F ′ is the result
of replacing every m-query φ by its corresponding query ψ. Then, from Lemma D.2, it follows
that I(F ′) = I(F ) and, thus, I(F ′) · r1 6≤ I(A) which is a contradiction with the assumption
that I is a model of Q.
The other way around is symmetrical. Assume that I is a model and P and suppose that I is
not a model of Q. Then, there is some rule r′ of the form (ri : A ← F ′) in Q such that
I(F ′) · r1 6≤ I(A). However, since r′ is in Q there is a rule r of the form (ri : A ← F ) in P
where F ′ is the result of replacing every m-query φ by its corresponding query ψ. Then, from
Lemma D.2, it follows that I(F ′) = I(F ) and, thus, I(F ) · r1 6≤ I(A) which is a contradiction
with the assumption that I is a model of P .
Proof of Proposition 20
Lemma D.3. Let F be some formula and F ′ be is corresponding m-formula obtained by replac-
ing every query ψ by its corresponding m-query φ given by φ(G) = ψ(G, 1). Then, it holds that
I(F ) = I(F ′) for every interpretation I .
Proof. In case that F = (ψ :: A) is a causal literal, by definition
I(ψ :: A) =
∑{
G ∈ GLb
∣∣ G∈ max I(A) and ψ(G, I(A)) = 1 }
Furthermore, since ψ is monotonic, ψ(G, I(A)) = ψ(G, 1)) and, thus
I(ψ :: A) =
∑{
G ∈ GLb
∣∣ G∈ max I(A) and ψ(G, 1) = 1 }
Then, since φ(G) = ψ(G, 1), it is clear that
I(ψ :: A) =
∑{
G ∈ GLb
∣∣ G∈ max I(A) and φ(G) = 1 }
= I(φ :: A)
In case that F is not a m-literal, the proof follows by structural induction assuming as induction
hypothesis that I(E) = I(E′) for every subformulaE of F .
Proof of Proposition 20. Assume that I is a model and Q and suppose that I is not a model
of P . Then, there is some rule r of the form (ri : A ← F ) in P such that I(F ) · r1 6≤ I(A).
However, since r is in P there is a rule r′ of the form (ri : A ← F ) in Q where F ′ is the result
of replacing every m-query φ by its corresponding query ψ. Then, from Lemma D.3, it follows
that I(F ′) = I(F ) and, thus, I(F ′) · r1 6≤ I(A) which is a contradiction with the assumption
that I is a model of Q.
The other way around is symmetrical. Assume that I is a model and P and suppose that I is
not a model of Q. Then, there is some rule r′ of the form (ri : A ← F ′) in Q such that
I(F ′) · r1 6≤ I(A). However, since r′ is in Q there is a rule r of the form (ri : A ← F ) in P
where F ′ is the result of replacing every m-query φ by its corresponding query ψ. Then, from
Lemma D.3, it follows that I(F ′) = I(F ) and, thus, I(F ) · r1 6≤ I(A) which is a contradiction
with the assumption that I is a model of P .
Proof of Theorem 1
Proof of Theorem 1. If P is the corresponding program of some positive m-program Q, the
result directly follows from Proposition 19 plus Proposition 4 and if Q is the corresponding m-
program of some monotonic program P , the result directly follows from Proposition 20 plus
Proposition 4.
Proof of Corollary 1 and 3
Proof of Corollary 3. This is an immediately consequence of Theorem 7 and Proposition 20.
Just note that the that from Proposition 20 we can translate a program into its corresponding
m-program and, then, use the TP operator for m-programs to compute its least model. Note also
that, from Lemma D.3, the TP operators for m-programs and programs give the same results.
Proof of Corollary 1. Note that, from Proposition 4, the causal stable models of programs w.r.t.
Definition 7 and 18 agree and, therefore, the statement directly follows from Corollary 3.
Proof of Corollary 2 and 4
Proof of Corollary 4. This is an immediately consequence of Theorem 8 and Proposition 20.
Just note that regular programs only contain the query ψ1 which is monotonic.
Proof of Corollary 2. Note that, from Proposition 4, the causal stable models of programs w.r.t.
Definition 7 and 18 agree and, therefore, the statement directly follows from Corollary 4.
Proof of Theorem 2 and Corollary 5
Proof of Corollary 5. Suppose there is some causal stable model I of P which is not a causal
stable model of Q and let P ′ and Q′ be the corresponding m-programs of P I and QI , respec-
tively. Then, I is the least model of P I and, from Proposition 20, I is also the least model of
P I . Just note that regular programs only contain the query ψ1 which is monotonic. Since Q is
the result of removing all labels in P , then QI and Q′ are the result of removing all labels in P I
and P ′, respectively. From, Theorem 9, this implies that I is the least model of Q′. Then, from
Proposition 20 again, this implies that I is the least model of QI which is a contradiction with
the assumption that I is not a causal stable model of Q. The other way around is analogous.
Proof of Theorem 2. Note that, from Proposition 4, the causal stable models of programs w.r.t.
Definition 7 and 18 agree and, therefore, the statement directly follows from Corollary 5.
Proof of Corollary 6
Proof of Corollary 6. Just note that any two programs that only differ in their labels share the
same unlabelled version Q and, thus, the proof immediately follows from Corollary 2.
Proof of Proposition 18
For any programP and interpretations I and J , by TP,I(J) we denote an interpretation satisfying
TP,I(J)(A)
def=
∑{
G ∈ CLb
∣∣ G ≤ TP (J)(A) and G∈ max I(A) }
for every atom A ∈ At.
Lemma D.4. Let I be the least model of some monotonic program P . Then I = T↑ωP,I(0).
Proof. It is clear that T↑αP,I(0) ≤ T↑αP (0) for every ordinal α. Furthermore, from Theorem 1, it
follows that I = T↑ωP (0) and, thus, T
↑ω
P,I(0) ≤ I . Suppose for the sake of contradiction that this
inequality is strict, that is, T↑ωP,I(0) < I holds. Then, there is some atom A and causal value
G∈ max I(A) such that G 6≤ T↑αP,I(0) for every α < ω. Since I = T
↑ω
P (0) and G ≤ I(A),
it follows that there is some α < ω such that G ≤ T↑αP (0)(A). But G ≤ T
↑α
P (0)(A) and
G∈ max I(A) implies that G ≤ T↑αP,I(0)(A) which is a contradiction.
Lemma D.5. Let I be the least model of some monotonic program P and α be an ordinal. Let
ψ be a causal query and let Q be either P I or the result of replacing in P I the reduced causal
query ψt by its non-reduced form ψ. If T↑αP,I(0) ≤ T↑αQ (0) ≤ I , then T↑αP,I(0)(F ) ≤ T↑αQ (0)(F ′)
for every monotonic formula F and F ′ where F ′ is either F I or the result of replacing in F I the
reduced causal query ψt by its non-reduced form ψ.
Proof. If F = (ψ′ :: A) is a causal literal and ψ′ = ψ, then F ′ = F and the result trivially holds.
Then, assume that ψ′ 6= ψ. Thus, G∈ maxT↑αP,I(0)(ψ :: A) holds only if
• G∈ maxT↑αP,I(0)(A), and
• ψ(G, T↑αP,I(0)(A)) = 1.
By definition, it follows that G∈ maxT↑αP,I(0)(A) holds only ifG∈ max I(A). Furthermore, by
hypothesis, it follow thatG∈ maxT↑αP,I(0)(A) ≤ T
↑α
Q (0)(A) ≤ I(A). Then,G∈ max I(A) and
G ≤ T↑αQ (0)(A) ≤ I(A) imply
G ∈ max T↑αQ (0)(A) (D2)
On the other hand, G∈ maxT↑αP,I(0)(ψ :: A) imply that ψ(G, T
↑α
P,I(0)(A)) = 1 which, since ψ
is monotonic, implies that ψ(G, I(A)) = 1. Then, since G∈ max I(A) and ψ(G, I(A)) = 1, it
follows that ψI(A)(G, u) = 1 for every u ∈ VLb. This plus (D2) implyG ≤ T↑αQ (0)(ψI(A) :: A).
Let us define the rank of a formula such that the rank of a causal literal is 0 and the rank of
any other formula is the greater than the rank of all their subformulas and assume as induction
hypothesis that T↑αP,I(0)(E) ≤ T
↑α
Q (0)(E
′) for every monotonic formulaE of less rank than F .
In case that F = (E,H), it follows that G∈ maxT↑αP,I(0)(F ) holds only if there are causal
values G1 and G2 such that G1 ≤ T↑αP,I(0)(E) and G2 ≤ T
↑α
P,I(0)(H) such that G ≤ G1 ∗G2.
Since E and H have less rank than F , by induction hypothesis, it follows that
G1 ≤ T
↑α
P,I(0)(E) ≤ T
↑α
Q (0)(E
′) (D3)
G2 ≤ T
↑α
P,I(0)(H) ≤ T
↑α
Q (0)(H
′) (D4)
and, thus, G ≤ G1 ∗G2 ≤ T↑αQ (0)(F ′).
Finally, note that the case in which F = (E;H) is analogous and that since F is monotonic the
case F = notE is not valid.
Lemma D.6. Let I be the least model of some monotonic program P . Then, I is the least model
of program Q where Q is the result of replacing some causal literal (ψ :: A) in Q by its reduced
form (ψI(A) :: A).
Proof. Suppose for the sake of contradiction that I is not a model of program Q. Then, there
is a rule r′ = (ri : A ← F ′) is Q such that I(F ′)·ri 6≤ I(A) where F ′ is the result of re-
placing in F some causal literal (ψ :: A) in Q by its reduced form (ψI(A) :: A). Since, from
Lemma D.1, it follows that I(F ′) ≤ I(F ) and ‘·’ is monotonic, I(F ′)·ri 6≤ I(A) implies that
I(F )·ri 6≤ I(A) which is a contradiction with the fact that I is a model of P because there is a
rule r = (ri : A ← F ) in P .
To show that I is the least model of Q assume as induction hypothesis that T↑βP,I(0) ≤ T
↑β
Q (0)
for every ordinal β < α. Note that, if α = 0, then T↑0P,I(0) = 0 and, thus, the hypothesis trivially
holds.
In case that α is a successor ordinal,G∈ maxT↑αP,I(0)(A) holds only ifG∈ max I(A) and there
is some rule r = (ri : A ← F ) in P and causal value G′ ∈ CLb such that G′ ≤ T↑α−1P,I (0)(F )
and G ≤ G′·ri. Furthermore, by induction hypothesis, it follows that T↑α−1P,I (0) ≤ T
↑α−1
Q (0)
and, thus, Lemma D.5 implies that T↑α−1P,I (0)(F ) ≤ T
↑α−1
Q (0)(F
′) for every monotonic for-
mula F and, thus, G ≤ T↑αQ (0)(A).
In case that α is a limit ordinal, G ≤ T↑αP,I(0) implies G ≤ T
↑β
P,I(0) for some β < α which, by
induction hypothesis, implies G ≤ T↑βQ (0) ≤ T
↑α
Q (0).
Consequently, T↑αP,I(0) ≤ T
↑α
P I
(0) for every ordinal α. Furthermore, from Theorem 1, it follows
that T↑ωQ (0) is the least model of Q and, from Lemma D.4 and the fact that I is the least model
of P it follows that I = T↑ωP,I(0). Since I is a a model of Q and I ≤ T
↑ω
Q (0), it follows that I
must be the least model of Q.
Proof of Proposition 18. Let Q be the reduct of program P w.r.t. I and Definition 10 andQ′ be
the reduct of program P w.r.t. I and Definition 26. Then,Q is monotonic and, from Lemma D.6,
it follows that I is the least model of Q iff I is the least model of Q′.
Proof of Proposition 7
Proof of Proposition 7. Suppose that I is not a model of P . Then there is a rule r in P of the
form of (10) such that I(F )·ri 6≤ I(A). Since rule r is in P , rule rI of the form
ri : A ← F
I (D5)
is in P I . Furthermore, I(F ) = I(F I) from Proposition 28 and, thus, I(F I)·ri 6≤ I(A). That is,
I is not a model of rI and, consequently, is not a model of P I which contradicts the assumption
that I is a causal stable model of P .
Lemma D.7. Let P be a program, I be an interpretation and α be an ordinal. LetQ be the result
of replacing in P I the reduced causal query ψt of every monotonic query by its non-reduced
form ψ. If T↑αQ,I(0) ≤ T↑αP I (0) ≤ I , then T↑αQ,I(0)(F ′) ≤ T↑αP I (0)(F I) for every monotonic
formulas F ′ and F I where F ′ is the result of replacing in F I the reduced causal query ψt of
every monotonic query by its non-reduced form ψ.
Proof. If F = (ψ :: A) is a causal literal and ψ is not a monotonic causal query, then F ′ = F I
and the result trivially holds. Then, assume that ψ is a monotonic causal query. This implies that
G∈ maxT↑αQ,I(0)(ψ :: A) holds only if
• G∈ maxT↑αQ,I(0)(A), and
• ψ(G, T↑αQ,I(0)(A)) = 1.
By definition, it follows that G∈ maxT↑αQ,I(0)(A) holds only if G∈ max I(A). Furthermore,
by hypothesis, it follow that G∈ maxT↑αQ,I(0)(A) ≤ T
↑α
P I
(0)(A) ≤ I(A). Then, G∈ max I(A)
and G ≤ T↑αQ,I(0)(A) ≤ I(A) imply
G ∈ max T↑α
P I
(0)(A) (D6)
On the other hand, G∈ maxT↑αQ (0)(ψ :: A) imply that ψ(G, T
↑α
Q (0)(A)) = 1 which, since ψ
is monotonic, implies that ψ(G, I(A)) = 1. Then, since G∈ max I(A) and ψ(G, I(A)) = 1,
it follows that ψI(A)(G, u) = 1 for every causal value u ∈ VLb. This plus (D6) imply that
G ≤ T↑α
P I
(0)(ψI(A) :: A) = T↑α
P I
(0)(F I).
Let us define the rank of a formula such that the rank of a causal literal is 0 and the rank of
any other formula is the greater than the rank of all their subformulas and assume as induction
hypothesis that T↑αQ,I(0)(E′) ≤ T
↑α
P I
(0)(EI) for every monotonic formulaE of less rank than F .
In case thatF = (E,H), it follows thatG∈ maxT↑αQ (0)(F ) holds only if there are causal values
G1 and G2 such that G1 ≤ T↑αQ (0)(E′) and G2 ≤ T
↑α
Q (0)(H
′) such that G ≤ G1 ∗G2. Since E
and H have less rank than F , by induction hypothesis, it follows that
G1 ≤ T
↑α
Q (0)(E
′) ≤ T↑αQ (0)(E
I) (D7)
G2 ≤ T
↑α
Q (0)(H
′) ≤ T↑αQ (0)(H
I) (D8)
and, thus, G ≤ G1 ∗G2 ≤ T↑αP I (0)(F
I).
The case in which F = (E;H) is analogous. In case that F = notE, by definition it follows
that F ′ = ⊥ iff F I = ⊥ and F ′ = ⊤ iff F I = ⊤
Proof of Proposition 1 and 8
Lemma D.8. The reduct F I of a formula F w.r.t. any interpretation I is ≤-monotonic, that is,
J(F I) ≤ K(F I) for all causal interpretations J and K such that J ≤ K .
Proof. From Proposition 24, the reduct of any queryψI(A) is monotonic. Furthermore, the reduct
of any formula F I is positive. Hence, F I is monotonic and, from Proposition 27, it follows that
formula F I is ≤-monotonic.
Proof of Proposition 8. From Proposition 7, any causal stable model I of a program P is
a model of P . Suppose that I is not supported, that is, there is some true atom A and cause
G ≤ I(A) sucht that no rule r in P of the form of (10) satisfies G ≤ I(F )·ri. Furthermore, from
Proposition 28, it follows that I(F I) = I(F ). That is, no rule rI in P I satisfies G ≤ I(F I)·ri.
Let J be a causal interpretation such that J(B) = I(B) for every atom B 6= A and J(A) =∑
{ G′ ∈ CLb
∣∣ G′ ≤ I(A) and G 6≤ G′ }. Clearly J < I and, since I is a ≤-minimal model
of P I , J cannot be a model of P I . That is, there is a rule rI in P I of the form of (10) such that
J(F I)·ri 6≤ J(A). Then there is a cause G′ ≤ J(F I)·ri such that G′ 6≤ J(A). Since I ≤ J , it
follows that J(F I) ≤ I(F I) (Lemma D.8) and thus, since application is monotonic, it follows
that G′ ≤ I(F I)·ri. Note that G′ ≤ I(F I)·ri, but no rule in P I with A in the head satisfies
G ≤ I(F I)·ri. Then G 6≤ G′. Moreover, since I |= rI , it follows that G′ ≤ I(A) and then,
since G 6≤ G′, it follows that G′ ≤ J(A), which is a contradiction with the fact that G′ 6≤ J(A).
Consequently, I is a supported model of P .
Proof of Proposition 1. Note that, from Proposition 4, the causal stable models of programs
w.r.t. Definition 7 and 18 agree and, therefore, the statement directly follows from Proposition 8.
Proof of Proposition 2 and 9
Lemma D.9. Let P be a normal program and I and J be two causal interpretation such that
J ≤ I . If J is a model of P , then J is a model of P I .
Proof. Suppose that J is a model of P and not a model of P I . Then, there is a rule r in P of the
form of (10) such that J(F )·ri ≤ J(A) and J(F I)·ri 6≤ J(A). Note that, since P is a normal
program, the formula F must also be normal. Then, since J ≤ I , Proposition 30 implies that
J(F I) ≤ J(F ). Furthermore, since application ‘·’ is monotonic, it follows that
J(F I)·ri ≤ J(F )·ri ≤ J(A)
which is a contradiction with the fact that J(F I)·ri 6≤ J(A).
Proof of Proposition 9. If I is a causal stable model of P , then, Proposition 7 implies that I is
a model of P . Suppose that I is not ≤-minimal. Then there exists an interpretation J ≤ I such
that J is a model of P . But, since P is a normal program, from Lemma D.9, J must be a model
of P I and, thus, I is not a ≤-minimal model of P I which contradicts the assumption that I is a
causal stable model of P .
Proof of Proposition 2. Note that, from Proposition 4, the causal stable models of programs
w.r.t. Definition 7 and 18 agree and, therefore, the statement directly follows from Proposition 9.
Proof of Theorem 3 and 5
Definition 31. A splitting of a program P is a pair 〈Pb, Pt〉 of pairwise disjoint sets such that
P = (Pb ∪ Pt) and no atom occurring in the head of a rule in Pt occurs in the body of a rule
in Pb. A splitting is said to be strict if, in addition, no atom occurring in the head of a rule in Pt
occurs (the head of a rule) in Pb.
Lemma D.10. Let Pb and Pt be two monotonic programs such that no atom occurring in a body
in Pb is a head atom of Pt. Let I and J be the least models of (Pb ∪ Pt) and Pb, respectively.
Then, I is also the least model of program (J ∪ Pt). Furthermore, J|S = I|S where S is the set
of atoms of all atoms not in the head of any rule in Pt.
Proof. Since interpretation J is the least model of the program J and J ≤ I , it follows that I
satisfies all rules in program J . In addition, since I is the least model of program (Pb ∪ Pt), it
is clear that I also satisfies all rules in Pt and, thus, I satisfies all rules in program (J ∪ Pt).
Suppose that I is not the least model of (I ∪ Pt). Then, there is a model I ′ of (J ∪ Pt) such
that I ′ < I . Since I is the least model of program (Pb ∪ Pt) and I ′ < I , it follow that I ′ does
not satisfy some rule r = (ri : A← F ) in (Pb ∪ Pt). That is, I ′(F ) · ri 6≤ I ′(A). Since I ′
is a model of (J ∪ Pt), it is clear that J ≤ I ′ and, since in addition I ′ < I , it follows that
I(F ) · ri 6≤ J(A) also holds. Furthermore, I ′ satisfy all rules in Pt because I ′ is a model of
(J ∪Pt) and, thus, rule r must be in Pb and no atom occurring in F occurs in the head of a rule in
Pt. Hence, I(F ) = J(F ) and, thus, I(F ) ·ri 6≤ J(A) implies that J(F ) ·ri 6≤ J(A) which is a
contradiction with the hypothesis that J is a model of Pb and the fact that r in Pb. Consequently,
I is also the least model of program (J ∪Pt). Furthermore, since I is the least model of program
(J ∪ Pt) and no atom in S occurs in the head of any rule in Pt, it follows that I|S = J|S .
Proof of Theorem 5. For the only if direction. Assume that I is a causal stable model of program
(Pb∪Pt). Then, I is the least model of the monotonic program (Pb∪Pt)I = (P Ib ∪P It ). Let J be
the least model of P Ib . Since I and J respectively are the least models of (P Ib ∪ P It ) and P Ib and
no atom occurring in a body in P Ib is in the head of any rule in P It , from Lemma D.10, it follows
that I is the least model of program (J ∪P It ) = (J ∪Pt)I and, consequently, I is a causal stable
model of (J ∪ Pt) and I|S = J|S where S is the set of atoms of all atoms not occurring in the
head of any rule in Pt. In addition, since I|S = J|S and all atoms in the body of some rule in Pb
are in S, it follows that P Ib = P Jb and, therefore, J is the least model of P Ib = P Jb and a causal
stable model of Pb. Furthermore, if no atom occurring in Pb occurs in the head of a rule in Pt,
then J|S = J (note that S contains all atoms in Pb since no atom occurring in Pb occurs in the
head of a rule in Pt) and, thus, I|S = J .
The other way around. If I is a causal stable model of (J ∪ Pt), then I is the least model
of (J ∪ Pt)I = (J ∪ P It ). Let S be the of all atoms not occurring in the head of a rule in Pt.
Then, S contains all atoms occurring in the body of the rules in Pb and, since I is the least model
of (J ∪P It ), it follows that I|S = J|S and, thus, P Ib = P Jb . Then, since J is a causal stable model
of Pb, it follows that J is the least model of P Ib . From Lemma D.10, this implies that I is the
least model of program (P Ib ∪ P It ) = (Pb ∪ Pt)I = P I and, thus, I is a causal stable model
of P .
Proof of Theorem 3. Note that, from Proposition 4, the causal stable models of programs w.r.t.
Definition 7 and 18 agree and, therefore, the statement directly follows from Theorem 5.
Proof of Theorem 6
Lemma D.11. Let (Pα)α<µ a splitting sequence of some monotonic program P . Then, there is
a unique solution (Iα)α<µ of (Pα)α<µ and it satisfies (i) I =
∑
α<µ Iα and (ii) Iα|Sα = I|Sα
where I is the least model of P and Sα is the set of all atoms not occurring in the head of any
rule in
⋃
α<β<µ Pβ .
Proof. First note that, since P is a monotonic program, every Pα with α < µ is also monotonic
and, thus, there is a unique causal stable model I0 of P0. Suppose that there is a solution (I ′α)α<µ
of (Pα)α<µ such that I ′α 6= Iα for some α < µ. Let α be the first ordinal such that I ′α 6= Iα.
Then, 0 < α < µ and there are two different causal stable models Iα and I ′α of (Jα ∪Pα) which
is a contradiction with the fact that (Jα ∪ Pα) is monotonic.
Let I =
∑
α<µ Iα and we will show that I is the least model of P and that Iα = I|Sα . Assume
as induction hypothesis that the lemma statement holds for every ordinal µ′ < µ and note that,
in case that µ = 0, it follows that P =
⋃
α<0 Pα = ∅ and that I =
∑
α<0 Iα = 0 and that 0 is
the least model of the empty program.
In case that µ is a successor ordinal, let µ′ = µ − 1 be its predecessor, let Q =
⋃
α<µ′ Pα and
J be the least model of Q. Then, (Iα)α<µ′ is solution of (Pα)α<µ′ , 〈Q,Pµ′〉 is a splitting of P ,
and, by induction hypothesis J =
∑
α<µ′ Iα and Iα|Sα = J|Sα for every α < µ′.
Let Iµ′ be the least model of (J ∪ Pµ′ ). Since Iµ′ is the least model of (J ∪ Pµ′), it follows
that Iµ′ ≥ J and, thus, I =
∑
α<µ Iα = Iµ′ +
∑
α<µ′ Iα = Iµ′ + J = Iµ′ . That is, I = Iµ′ is
the least model of (J ∪ Pµ′) and, since J is the least model of Q, from Lemma D.10, it follows
that I is the least model of P = (Q∪Pµ′ ) and, that, Iµ′ |Sµ′ = I|Sµ′ . Furthermore, since no atom
in Sα with α < µ′ occurs in the head of any rule in Pµ′ it follows that I|Sα = J|Sα for every
α < µ′. Consequently Iα|Sα = I|Sα for every α < µ.
In case that µ is a limit ordinal, by induction hypothesis Iα|Sα = I|Sα for every α < µ′ and, thus,
since all atoms occurring in the body of any rule in Pα belong to Sα, it follows that P Iαα = P Iα .
Furthermore, since (Iα)α<µ is solution of (Pα)α<µ, it follows that Iα is the least model of
(Jα ∪ Pα) and, thus, Iα is a model of P Iαα = P Iα . Since I =
∑
α<µ Iα ≥ Iα, then I is a model
of P Iα for every α < µ′ and, consequently, I is a model of P I .
Suppose that I is not the least model of P . Then, there is a model I ′ of P such that I ′ < I .
Since I =
∑
α<µ Iα and I ′ < I , it follows that Iα 6≤ I ′ for some first ordinal α < µ. Since α is
the first ordinal such that Iα 6≤ I ′, it follows that Jα =
∑
β<α Iβ ≤ I
′ and, thus, I ′ satisfies all
rules in Jα. Furthermore, since Pα ⊆ P and I ′ is model of P , it follows that I ′ also satisfies all
rules in Pα. That is, I ′ is a model of (Jα ∪Pα) and Iα 6≤ I which is a contradiction with the fact
that Iα is the least model of (Jα ∪ Pα). Consequently, I is the least model of P .
Suppose now that Iα|Sα 6= I|Sα for some α < µ and let α be the first such ordinal. Then,
there is some first ordinal α′ and atom A ∈ Sα such that Iα(A) 6≤ Iα′(A). Note that α′ ≤ α
implies that Iα′ ≤ Iα and, thus, it must be that α < α′. Since α′ first ordinal that satisfies
Iα(A) 6≤ Iα′(A) it follows that Iβ(A) ≤ Iα(A) for every β < α′ and, thus, Jα′(A) ≤ Iα(A).
Since Jα′(A) ≤ Iα(A) 6≤ Iα′(A) and Iα′ is the least model of (Jα′ ∪ Pα′), there must be some
rule r = (ri : A ← F ) ∈ Pα′ which is a contradiction with the fact that A ∈ Sα and α < α′.
Consequently, Iα|Sα = I|Sα for all α < µ.
Proof of Theorem 6. For the only if direction. Assume that I is a causal stable model ofP . Then,
I is the least model of the monotonic program P I and, from Lemma D.11 there is a unique
solution (Iα)α<µ of program P I and it satisfies (i) I =
∑
α<µ Iα and (ii) Iα|Sα = I|Sα .
Furthermore, by definition, align=Center, leftmargin=10pt, itemindent=0.5pt
1. I0 is the least model of P I0 ,
2. Iα is a stable model of (Jα ∪ P Iα) for any ordinal 0 < α < µ where Jα =
∑
β<α Iβ .
Since Iα|Sα = I|Sα and all atoms occurring in the body of any rule in Pα belong to Sα, it follows
that P Iα = P Iαα and, thus, align=Center, leftmargin=10pt, itemindent=0.5pt
1. I0 is the least model of P Iα0 ,
2. Iα is a stable model of (Jα ∪ Pα)Iα = (Jα ∪ P Iαα ) for any ordinal 0 < α < µ where
Jα =
∑
β<α Iβ .
Consequently, (Iα)α<µ is a solution of (Pα)α<µ and it satisfies I =
∑
α<µ Iα and Iα|Sα = I|Sα .
The other way around. Assume there is some solution (Iα)α<µ of (Pα)α<µ and let I =
∑
α<µ Iα.
By definition, align=Center, leftmargin=10pt, itemindent=0.5pt
1. I0 is the least model of P I00 ,
2. Iα is the least model of (Jα ∪ P Iαα ) for any ordinal 0 < α < µ where Jα =
∑
β<α Iβ .
Since Sα contains all atoms not in the head of any rule in
⋃
α<β<µ Pβ , it follows that∑
β<α
Iβ |Sα = Jα|Sα ≤ Iα|Sα = Jα+1|Sα = Iα+1|Sα = . . . =
∑
β<µ
Iβ |Sα = I|Sα
and, since Sα contains all atoms occurring in the body of all rules in Pα, it follows that P Iα = P Iαα
and, thus, align=Center, leftmargin=10pt, itemindent=0.5pt
1. I0 is the least model of P I0 ,
2. Iα is the least model of (Jα ∪ P Iα) for any ordinal 0 < α < µ where Jα =
∑
β<α Iβ .
Hence, (Iα)α<µ of (P Iα)α<µ and, from Lemma D.11, it follows that I is the least model of P I
and a causal stable model of P .
Furthermore, if (Iα)α<µ is a strict solution in α, then no atom occurring in Pα occurs in the head
of a rule in any Pβ with α < β < µ, and, thus, every atom occurring in (Jα∪Pα) belongs to Sα.
Consequently, Iα = Iα|Sα = I|Sα .
Proof of Proposition 3 and 10
Proof of Proposition 10. Let Pα+1 be the set of rules of the form of (A1) such that λ(A) = α
and Pα = ∅ if α is a limit ordinal. Then, (Pα)α<µ is a strict splitting sequence of P and, from
Theorem 6, an interpretation I is a causal stable model of P iff there is some solution (I|Sα)α<µ
of (Pα)α<µ such that I =
∑
α<µ I|Sα . where Sα is the set of all atoms not occurring in the head
of any rule in
⋃
α<β<µ Pβ . Hence, it is enough to show that every Pα has a unique causal stable
model.
By definition, it is clear that Pα has the 0 interpretation as its unique causal stable model when
α is a limit ordinal. In case that α is a successor ordinal, suppose that there are two different
causal stable models J and J ′ of Pα. Since P is stratified, there is no rule in
⋃
α−1<β<µ Pβ with
an atom occurring in Pα under the scope of negation or a non-monotonic causal literal in Pα.
Hence, J(B) = J ′(B) = I|Sα−1(B) for every atom B occurring under the scope of negation
or a non-monotonic causal literal and, thus, P J = P J′ and J and J ′ must be equal which is a
contradiction with the assumption.
Proof of Proposition 3. Note that, from Proposition 4, the causal stable models of programs
w.r.t. Definition 7 and 18 agree and, therefore, the statement directly follows from Proposition 10.
Just note that, according to Definition 5, ⊥ is not allowed in the head of the rules.
Proof of Proposition 11
Proof of Proposition 11. Let R be any causal program over the signature σ of P and Q. Let
I, J respectively be the sets of causal stable models of program P ∪ R and Q ∪ R. Any causal
stable model I ∈ I is the least model of the positive program (P ∪ R)I = P I ∪ RI . That is, I
satisfies all rules in both P I and RI and, since P ⇔ Q, I satisfies all rules in QI . Suppose there
exists I ′ which satisfies all rules in (Q ∪ R)I and I ′ < I . By the same reasoning I ′ satisfies all
rules in P I (an also in RI ) contradicting the assumption that I is the lest model of (P ∪ R)I .
Hence, I is the least model of (P ∪ R)I , and so, an stable model of (P ∪ R). That is, I ∈ J .
The other way around is analogous.
Proof of Proposition 12
Lemma D.12. Let F , G and H be formulas such that F ⇔ G. If a formula H ′ is obtained from
H by replacing some regular occurrences of F by G, then H ⇔ H ′.
Proof. By structural induction like Lemma 4 in (Lifschitz et al. 1999). If H is elementary. Then
either H = F and H ′ = G or H = H ′. In both cases H ⇔ H ′. Otherwise, if H = F and
H ′ = G, then also H ⇔ H ′. Hence, in the following we assume that H 6= F .
1. In case H = H1, H2, then H ′ = H ′1, H ′2 and, by induction hypothesis, Hi ⇔ H ′i with
i ∈ {1, 2}. Then
I(HJ) = I((H1, H2)
J)
= I(HJ1 , H
J
2 )
= I(HJ1 ) ∗ I(H
J
2 )
= I((H ′1)
J ) ∗ I((H ′2)
J)
= I((H ′1, H
′
2)
J)
= I((H ′)J )
2. The case H = H1;H2 is similar to the previous one.
3. In case H = notH1, then H ′ = notH ′1 and, by induction hypothesis, H1 ⇔ H ′1.
I(HJ) = 1 iff I((notH1)J) = 1
iff J(HJ1 ) = 0
iff J((H ′1)J) = 0
iff I((notH ′1)J) = 1
iff I((H ′)J ) = 1
and I(HJ ) = 0 otherwise, that is, iff I((H ′)J ) = 0
Proof of Proposition 12. Similar to the proof of Proposition 3 in (Lifschitz et al. 1999). Let
Q be the program obtained by replacing some occurrences of F by G in P . Assume that I is
satisfies all rules in QJ . Take any rule (ri : A← F ) in P . Its corresponding rule (ri : A← E)
in Q must satisfy
I(EJ ) · ri ≤ I(A)
and, by Lemma D.12, it follows that I(F J ) = I(EJ ). Consequently,
I(F J ) · ri ≤ I(A)
Hence, I satisfies all rules in P . The other way around is similar. Hence, I satisfies all rules
in P J iff I satisfies all rules in QJ . That is P ⇔ Q and, by Proposition 11, P andQ are strongly
equivalent.
Proof of Proposition 13
Proof of Proposition 13. For (i) note that
I((F,E)J ) = I(F J , EJ )
= I(F J) ∗ I(EJ )
= I(EJ) ∗ I(F J )
= I((E,F )J )
Similarly, I((F ;E)J ) = I((E;F )J ). Note that product and addition are both commutative. The
same reasoning applies for (ii) and (iii) by noting that product and addition are also associative
and distributes over one over the other.
For (iv),
I((not not notF )J ) = 1 iff J((notnotF )J) = 0
iff J((notF )J ) = 1
iff J((notF )J ) = 1
iff J(F J) = 0
iff I((notF )J ) = 1
and I((not not notF )J) = 0 otherwise, that is I((notF )J) = 0.
Similarly, for (v),
I((not(F ;E))J ) = 1 iff J(F J ;EJ) = 0
iff J(F J ) + J(EJ) = 0
iff J(F J ) = 0 and J(EJ ) = 0
iff I((notF )J) = 1 and I((notE)J ) = 1
iff I((notF )J) ∗ I((notE)J) = 1
iff I((notF, notE)J ) = 1
and I(not(F ;E)J) = 0 otherwise, that is I((notF, notE)J ) = 0. Furthermore
I((not(F,E))J ) = 1 iff J((F,E)J ) = 0
iff J(F J ) ∗ J(EJ ) = 0
iff J(F J ) = 0 or J(EJ ) = 0
iff I((notF )J) = 1 or I((notE)J ) = 1
iff I((notF )J) + I((notE)J ) = 1
iff I((notF ; notE)J ) = 1
and I((not(F,E))J ) = 0 otherwise, that is I((notF ; notE)J ) = 0. (vi) and (vii) directly
follows from Proposition 5. Finally, for (viii), I(not⊤) = 0 = ⊥ and I(not⊥) = 1 = ⊤.
Proof of Proposition 14
Proof of Proposition 14. The proof follows by structural induction using Proposition 13 and Lemma D.12
exactly as in (Lifschitz et al. 1999). Note that we do not consider strong negation, so all formulas
are regular.
Proof of Proposition 15
Proof of Proposition 15. Note that I |= (ri : A← F ;E)J iff I |= (ri : A← F J ;EJ)(
I(F J) + I(EJ )
)
· ri ≤ I(A)
which, by application distributivity over addition, is equivalent to
I(F J )·ri + I(G
J ) · ri ≤ I(A)
which in turn holds iff I |= (ri : A ← F )J and I |= (ri : A ← E)J .
Proof of Proposition 16
Proof of Proposition 16. Propositions 11, 12 and 14 show that any program is strongly equiva-
lent to a set of rules of the form
ri : A ← F1; . . . ;Fm, (D9)
where each Fi is a simple conjunction. Similarly, Propositions 11, 12 and 15 show that such set
of rules is strongly equivalent to a set of rules of the form
ri : A ← F (D10)
where each F is a simply conjunction. That is, a set of rule of the form (10) in which the head
can be ⊥.
Proof of Proposition 17
Proof of Proposition 17. From Proposition 17, every program can be writing as an equivalent
program where all rules r are of the form
ri : A ← B1, . . . , Bm (D11)
whereA is an atom or⊥. IfA is an atom, then r is already of the form of (10). Otherwise, replace
rule r by a rule r′ of the form of
ri : auxr ← B1, . . . , Bm, notauxr (D12)
where auxr is a new auxiliary predicate. Let Q be the result of replacing r by r′ in P . If I is a
causal stable model of P , then I 6|= Bj for some 1 ≤ j ≤ m and, thus, it is a causal stable model
of Q. The other way around, if I is a causal stable model of Q, either I |= auxr or I 6|= Bj for
some 1 ≤ j ≤ m. If the former, rule r′ does not belong to QI and, thus, there is no rule which
auxr which contradicts the fact that I must be the least model of QJ . Hence, I 6|= auxr and
I 6|= Bj for some 1 ≤ j ≤ m and, therefore, I is a causal stable model of P .
Appendix E. Complexity assessment
First, it has been showed in (Cabalar et al. 2014b) that there may an exponential number of causes
for some atom with respect to a casual stable model. For instance, consider the positive pro-
gram P16 consisting of following the rules:
a : p1
c : q1
b : p1
d : q1
mi : pi ← pi−1, qi−1 for i ∈ {2, . . . , n}
ni : qi ← pi−1, qi−1 for i ∈ {2, . . . , n}
Since program P16 is positive it has unique causal stable model I16. Furthermore, it is easy to
see that the interpretation of atoms p1 and q1 with respect to interpretation I16 are a + b and
c+ d, respectively. The interpretation for p2 corresponds to:
I16(p2) = (I(p1) ∗ I(q1)) ·m2 = ((a+ b) ∗ (c+ d)) ·m2
= (a ∗ c) ·m2 + (a ∗ d) ·m2 + (b ∗ c) ·m2 + (b ∗ d) ·m2
This addition cannot be further simplified. Analogously, I16(q2) can also be expressed as a sum
of four sufficient causes – we just replace m2 by n2 in I(p2). But then, I16(p3) corresponds
to (I16(p2) ∗ I16(q2)) · m3 and, applying distributivity, this yields a sum of 4 × 4 sufficient
causes. In the general case, each atom pn or qn has 22
n−1
sufficient causes so that expanding the
complete causal value into this additive normal form becomes intractable. Furthermore, it also
has been in (Cabalar et al. 2014b) that deciding whether a term without addition G is a brave
necessary cause with respect to some regular program P is ΣP2-complete and, thus, deciding the
existence of causal stable model is ΣP2-hard even for the class of programs that only contain a
unique necessary causal literal.
Proposition 31 (From Cabalar et al. 2014b). Given a causal term without addition G ∈ CLb
and an causal term t ∈ VLb in which the right-hand operand of every application “·” is a label,
deciding whether G ≤ t is feasible in polynomial time.
Proposition 32. Let {t, u} ⊆ VLb be two causal term in which the right-hand operand of every
application “·” is a label. Then deciding whether t ≤ u is in coNP.
Proof. Note hat t ≤ u iff everyG ∈ CLb such thatG ≤ t also satisfyG ≤ uwhich are decidable
in polynomial time (Proposition 31). Consequently, deciding whether t ≤ u is coNP.
Definition 32 (Causal graph). Given a set of labels Lb, a causal graph (c-graph) G ⊆ Lb × Lb
is a set of edges transitively and reflexively closed. By GLb we denote the set of all c-graphs that
can be formed with labels from Lb.
Theorem 10 (From (Fandinno 2015b)). For any finite and definite program P with n rules,
lfp(TP )=T↑nP (0) is its least model.
Definition 33. Let P be a program and I be an interpretation. By simply− nec(P I) we denote
the program obtained from P I by replacing every causal literal of the form (ψnecA :: A)I(A) by A
if I(A) ≤∑A; and by 0 otherwise.
Lemma E.1. Let P be a program and I be an interpretation. If T↑α
P I
(0) ≤ T↑αQ (0) ≤ I , then
T
↑α+1
P I
(0) ≤ T↑α+1Q (0) ≤ I where Q = simply− nec(P I).
Proof. Suppose first that T↑α+1
P I
(0)(A) 6≤ T↑α+1Q (0)(A) for some atom A. Then, since appli-
cation and addition are ≤-monotonic, there must be some rule of the form of (A1) such that
T
↑α
P I
(0)(F ) 6≤ T↑αQ (0)(F
′) where F ′ is just the result of replacing each causal literal of the
form (ψnecA :: A)I(A) by A if I(A) ≤
∑
A; and by 0 otherwise. Since products and addition are
monotonic, it is enough to show that
• T↑α
P I
(0)(ψ′ :: A) ≤ T↑αQ (0)(A) if I(A) ≤
∑
A, and
• T↑α
P I
(0)(ψ′ :: A) = 0 otherwise.
where
ψ′(G, I(A)) def=
{
1 iff exists some G′ ≤ G s.t. G′ ∈ max I(A) and I(A) ≤
∑
A
0 otherwise
By definition,
T
↑α
P I
(0)(ψnecA :: A)
I(A) def=
∑{
G∈ maxT↑α
P I
(0)(A)
∣∣ ψ′(G, I(A) ) = 1 }
One the one hand, T↑α
P I
(0)(ψ′ :: A) ≤ T↑α
P I
(0)(A) holds for every causal literal (ψ′ :: A) and, by
hypothesis, it holds that T↑α
P I
(0)(A) ≤ T↑αQ (0)(A) and, therefore,T
↑α
P I
(0)(ψ′ :: A) ≤ T↑αQ (0)(A)
also holds. On the other hand, I(A) 6≤
∑
A implies that ψ′(G, I(A) ) = 0 for every G ∈ CLb
and, thus, T↑α+1
P I
(0)(ψ′ :: A) = 0 ≤ T↑α+1Q (0)(A).
Similarly, to show that T↑αQ (0) ≤ I is enough to show T
↑α
P I
(0)(A) ≤ I(ψ′ :: A) when I(A) ≤∑
A. Note that, in case that I(A) 6≤
∑
A, the causal literal (ψ′ :: A) has been replaced by 0.
Then, for every G ≤ T↑αQ (0)(ψ′ :: A) there is some G′ ∈ max I(A) and ψ′(G′, I(A)) = 1 and,
consequently, it follows that G ≤ G′ ≤ I(ψ′ :: A).
Furthermore, it is easy to see that T↑αQ (0) ≤ I implies T
↑α
Q (0)(A) ≤ I(ψ
′ :: A) for every
causal literal (ψ′ :: A). Just note that if G ≤ T↑αQ (0)(ψ′ :: A), then G ≤ T
↑α
Q (0)(A) ≤ I(A)
and there is some G′ ≤ G such that G′ ∈ max I(A) and I(A) ≤
∑
A. Notice that facts G ≤
I(A), G′ ∈ max I(A) and G′ ≤ G implies that G = G′ and, thus, G∈ max I(A). Therefore,
G ≤ I(ψ′ :: A) and, thus,
T
↑α
Q (0)(ψ
′ :: A) ≤ I(ψ′ :: A)
Note now that the evaluation of conjunctions and disjunctions is ≤-monotonic and, thus, it can
be probed by induction that
T
↑α
P I
(0)(F ) ≤ T↑αQ (0)(F ) ≤ I(F )
for every formula F . Finally, since addition and application are also ≤-monotonic, it can be
shown by induction that
T
↑α
P I
(0)(F )·ri ≤ T
↑α
Q (0)(F )·ri ≤ I(F )·ri
and, thus,
T
↑α+1
P I
(0)(A) ≤ T↑α+1Q (0)(A) ≤ I(A)
for every label ri ∈ Lb and atom A ∈ At.
Lemma E.2. Let P be a program and I be an interpretation. Then T↑ω
P I
(0) ≤ T↑ωQ (0) ≤ I where
Q = simply− nec(P I).
Proof. By definition, T↑0
P I
(0) = T↑0Q (0) = 0 ≤ I and, thus, by induction using Lemma E.1,
it follows that T↑α
P I
(0) ≤ T↑αQ (0) ≤ I for every successor ordinal α. For a limit ordinal α,
G ≤ T↑α
P I
(0) iff there is some β < α s.t. G ≤ T↑β
P I
(0) ≤ T↑βQ (0) ≤ T
↑α
Q (0) and, thus, T
↑α
P I
(0) ≤
T
↑α
Q (0). The proof of T
↑α
Q (0) ≤ I is analogous. Hence, T
↑ω
P I
(0) ≤ T↑ωQ (0) ≤ I .
Lemma E.3. Let P be a program and I be an interpretation and Q = simply− nec(P I). If
for every atom A and causal term without addition G ≤ T↑αQ (0)(A) such that G∈ max I(A),
it holds that G ≤ T↑α
P I
(0)(A), then for every atom A and causal term without addition G ≤
T
↑α+1
Q (0)(A) such that G∈ max I(A), it holds that G ≤ T
↑α+1
P I
(0)(A)
Proof. Suppose there is some atom A and causal term without addition G ∈ CLb such that
G ≤ T↑α+1Q (0)(A) and G∈ max I(A), but G 6≤ T
↑α+1
Q (0)(A). Then, since application and
addition are ≤-monotonic, there must be some causal term without addition G′ ∈ CLb and rule
of the form of (A1) such that G ≤ G′·ri and G′ ≤ T↑αQ (0)(F ′), but G′ 6≤ T↑αP I (0)(F ) where F ′
is just the result of replacing each causal literal of the form (ψnecA :: A)I(A) byA if I(A) ≤
∑
A;
and by 0 otherwise. Since products and addition are monotonic and every causal literal in F of
the form of (ψ′ :: A) is replaced by 0 in F ′ when I(A) 6≤
∑
A, it is enough to show that
• G ≤ T↑αQ (0)(A) and G ∈ ∈ max I(A) implies G ≤ T
↑α
P I
(0)(ψ′ :: A) when I(A) ≤
∑
A
where ψ′ def=(ψnecA )I(A). Indeed, by hypothesis, from G ≤ T
↑α
Q (0)(A) and G∈ max I(A) it fol-
lows that G ≤ T↑α
P I
(0)(A). Furthermore, G∈ max I(A) and I(A) ≤
∑
A also imply that
(ψ′(G, I(A)) = 1 holds and, consequently, it follows that G ≤ T↑α
P I
(0)(ψ′ :: A).
Lemma E.4. Let P be a program and I be an interpretation and Q = simply− nec(P I).
Then, I = T↑ωQ (0) iff I = T↑ωP I (0)
Proof. First, assume that I = T↑ω
P I
(0). From Lemma E.2, it follows that T↑ω
P I
(0) ≤ T↑ωQ (0) ≤ I
and, thus, I = T↑ω
P I
(0) implies I = T↑ωQ (0).
The other way around. Assume I = T↑ωQ (0) and assume as induction hypothesis that G ≤
T
↑β
Q (0)(A) and G∈ max I(A), imply G ≤ T
↑β
P I
(0)(A) for every ordinal β < α. By definition,
T
↑0
Q (0) = 0 and the hypothesis holds vacuous. Furthermore, using Lemma E.3, the hypothesis
holds for every successor ordinal α. For a limit ordinal α, G ≤ T↑αQ (0) iff there is some β < α
s.t. G ≤ T↑βQ (0) and, thus, G ≤ T
↑β
P I
(0) ≤ T↑α
P I
(0). Then, for every G ≤ I(A) = T↑ωQ (0) there
is some G′ ∈ CLb such that G′ ∈ max I(A) = T↑ωQ (0) and, thus, G ≤ G′ ≤ T
↑ω
P I
(0)(A). That
is, T↑ωQ (0) ≤ T
↑ω
P I
(0). Finally, from Lemma E.2, it follows that T↑ω
P I
(0) ≤ T↑ωQ (0) and, thus, it
also holds I = T↑ω
P I
(0).
Lemma E.5. Let P be a program and I be an interpretation and Q = simply− nec(P I).
Then, I is a causal stable model of P iff T↑ωQ (0) = I .
Proof. By definition, I is a causal stable model of P iff I is the least model of P I iff T↑ω
P I
(0) = I
(Theorem 3) iff T↑ω
P I
(0) = I (Lemma E.4).
Proposition 33. Let t be a term and A be a set of labels. Then, t ≤ ∑A is decidable in
polynomial time.
Proof. If t ∈ Lb is a label, then t ≤ ∑A iff t ∈ A which is clearly decidable in polynomial
time. Otherwise, we assume as induction hypothesis that u ≤
∑
A and w ≤
∑
A are decidable
in polynomial time for every subterms u and w of t. In case that t = u + w, then t ≤
∑
A iff
u ≤
∑
A and w ≤
∑
A which are both decidable in polynomial time. Similarly, in case that
t = u ∗ w or t = u · w, then t ≤
∑
A iff u ≤
∑
A or w ≤
∑
A which are both decidable in
polynomial time.
Proposition 34. Let P be a causal program containing only necessary causal literals. Then,
deciding whether there exists a causal stable model of P or not is in NP.
Proof. First, note that there exists some causal stable model I of P iff there must exists some
program Q and casual stable model I such that Q is the result of replacing every maximal sub-
formula in P of the form notE by 1 if I |= notE and by 0 otherwise. Just note thatQI = P I for
every interpretation I . Then, from Lemma E.5, I is a causal stable model of P iff I is a causal
stable model of Q iff T↑ωQ′ (0) = I where Q′ = simply− nec(P I).
Hence, instead of guessing an interpretation I we will guess a program Q′. Let Q for every
maximal subformula be the result of replacing every maximal subformula in P of the form notE
by a guessed 0 or 1 and let Q′ be he result of replacing every necessary causal literal in Q of
the form of (ψnecA :: A) by a guessed 0 or A. Note that, since P only contains necessary causal
literals, Q′ is a positive regular (hence monotonic) program. From Theorem 10, it follows that
T
↑n
Q′(0) = T
↑ω
Q′ (0) is the least fixpoint of TQ′ and the least model of Q′ where n is the number of
rules in Q, which is the same as the number of rules in P . Let us define I = T↑nQ′(0). Since Q′ is
a regular program each step of TQ′ only involves the creation of a term from its subterms, which
is feasible in polynomial time and, thus, I can be computable in polynomial time.
Let us now check whetherQ′ = simply− nec(P I). Then, fail if I = T↑nQ′(0) do not satisfy
one of the following conditions
• I |= notE for some maximal subformula whose guessed value was 0
• I 6|= notE for some maximal subformula whose guessed value was 1
• I(A) ≤
∑
A for some necessary causal literal (ψnecA :: A) whose guessed value was 0
• I(A) 6≤
∑
A for some necessary causal literal (ψnecA :: A) whose guessed value was A
If reached this point, then Q′ = simply− nec(P I) and, hence, we the procedure succeed.
It just remain to show that these four conditions can be checked in polynomial time. The two
first only involve checking whether I(E) = 0 which is feasible simply simplifying the obtained
causal term and looking whether it is 0 or not. Finally, since A ⊆ Lb is a set of labels, from
Proposition 33, it follows that I(A) ≤
∑
A can be checked in polynomial time.
Proposition 35. Let P be a causal program containing only necessary causal literals. Then,
deciding whether there exists a causal stable model of P or not is in NP-complete (it is NP-hard
even in P only contains a single negated regular literal or P is positive but contains a single
constraint).
Proof. NP membership follows directly from Proposition 34 while NP-hard follows from the
fact that every regular program in also a causal program and deciding the existence of stable
model for standard programs in NP-complete. To show that it is NP-hard even when P only
contains a negated regular literal, we reduce the existence of stable model for standard program
to the satisfiability of a CNF Boolean formula ϕ to the existence of causal stable model of a
program P . We assume without of generality that no clause in ϕ has complementary variables.
For every variable xk occurring in ϕ, let Pk be a program containing rules of the form
xk : xk ←
txk : xk ← Atk necessary for xk
fxk : xk ← Afk necessary for xk
where Atk = {txk , xk} and Afk = {fxk , xk}. For each clause cj in ϕ, let P ′j be a program
containing a rule of the form of
cj ← Ajk necessary for xk (E1)
for each variable xk in cj , where Ajk = {txk , xk} if xk occurs positively in the clause cj and
Ajk = {fxk , xk} if xk occurs negatively in cj and let P ′′ be a program containing the following
rule
p ← c1, . . . , cm
where c1, . . . , cm are all the clauses in ϕ. Note that no atom occurring in the body of a program
Pk occurs in the head of a program P ′j nor P ′′ and no atom occurring in the body of a program
P ′j occurs in the head of a program P ′′. Hence, we can use the Splitting Theorem (Theorem 5).
Each program Pk has two causal stable models Ik and Jk that satisfy Ik(xk) = xk + txk and
Jk(xk) = xk + fxk and, thus, P =
⋃
k≤n Pn has 2n causal stable models here n is the number
of variables in ϕ: each causal stable model I satisfying I(xk) = xk + txk or I(xk) = xk + fxk
for each variable xk. We say that an variable xk is true in an interpretation I if I(xk) = xk+ txk
and that is false if I(xk) = xk + fxk . Then, (P ∪ P ′j) also has 2n causal models models where
each causal stable model I satisfy
I(cj) =
∑
{ xk + txk
∣∣ I(xk) = xk + txk and xk occurs positively in cj }
+
∑
{ xk + fxk
∣∣ I(xk) = xk + txk and xk occurs negatively in cj }
That is, I(cj) 6= 0 iff there is some variable xk such that xk is true in I and occurs positively
in cj or there is some variable xk such that xk is false in I and occurs negatively in cj iff I
represents an assignment that satisfies the clause cj . Let P ′ =
⋃
j≤m P
′
j . Then, P ′ also has 2n
causal models models: each causal stable model I satisfy for each clause cj that I(cj) 6= 0 iff
represents an assignment that satisfies the clause cj . It is easy to see now that (P ′ ∪ P ′′) has 2n
causal stable models where I(p) 6= 0 iff every cj satisfy I(cj) 6= 0 iff I represents an assignment
that satisfy all clauses cj in ϕ iff I represents an assignment that satisfy ϕ. Finally, let P be the
result of adding, to the program (P ′ ∪ P ′′), the following rule
p ← not p
Then, P has a causal stable model iff there is a causal stable model I of (P ′ ∪ P ′′) such that
I(p) 6= 0 iff I represents an assignment that satisfy ϕ. Alternatively, let Q′ be the result of
adding, to the program (P ′ ∪ P ′′), the following rules
q : q ←
q ← p
and Q be the result of adding to Q′ the constraint
⊥ ← Ap necessary for q
where Ap = {q}. Then, Q′ has 2n causal stable models: each causal stable model I satisfying
I(q) = q+ I(p) andQ has a causal stable model I iff there is a causal stable model I ofQ′ such
that I(q) > q iff there is a causal stable model I of Q′ such that I(p) 6= 0 iff I represents an
assignment that satisfy ϕ.
